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Colin E. Flora 
It’s a Trap! The Ethical Dark Side of Requests for Admission 
Abstract.  Due largely to an overlap of authority between disciplinary bodies 
charged with supervising the professional conduct of attorneys and the 
authority of courts to supervise litigation, the ethical ramifications of routine 
discovery abuses often pass without comment.  That is because disciplinary 
authorities routinely defer to courts to police litigation behavior despite courts 
frequently rejecting the role of enforcers of professional rules.  A further 
contributing factor to unethical conduct becoming routine practice in discovery 
are ill-defined parameters and a dearth of guidance.  One tool in particular, 
requests for admission, has gone overlooked in the literature and caselaw, but 
poses unique ethical challenges owing to its ability to transition false facts into 
reality. 
The article first analyzes the origins of modern discovery procedures and the 
cultural beliefs that have historically limited the practice.  It then looks to the 
permissible scope of requests for admission and outlines three frequent areas 
of abuse: requests made in bad faith, oppressive volumes of requests, and 
requests made in the absence of a reasonable belief that they will be admitted.  
Finally, the article explores how those abuses may constitute violations of 
specific Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Author.  Associate Attorney, Pavlack Law, LLC in Indianapolis, Indiana; 
J.D., 2011, cum laude, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law; 
B.A., 2008, with high distinction, Indiana University South Bend.  The author also 
manages the Hoosier Litigation Blog, which focuses on legal developments 
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It is no secret that discovery practice in American courts has become a 
quagmire capable of devouring untold time, energy, and treasure.1  Richard 
Posner has called discovery “the bane of modern litigation.”2  Judge 
Posner’s former colleague, Frank Easterbrook, has been no less critical of 
the bellicose nature of discovery, remarking: “That discovery is war comes 
as no surprise.  That discovery is nuclear war, as John Setear suggests, is.”3  
But often lost in the perceived utility of discovery tools as a proactive 
weapon in litigation are the ethical pitfalls associated with misuse. 
Although a small number of courts have viewed abusive discovery 
practices through the lens of ethical violations,4 it is considerably more 
 
1. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 
60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (“By some estimates, discovery costs now comprise between 50 and 90 
percent of the total litigation costs in a case.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); 
Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule 
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 547–48, 548 tbl.4 (1998); Judicial Conference Adopts Rules  
Changes—Confronts Projected Budget Shortfalls, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 15, 1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
news/1999/09/15/judicial-conference-adopts-rules-changes-confronts-projected-budget-shortfalls 
[https://perma.cc/5L2D-FAYP])); Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 861–77 
(2015) (discussing rational incentives for engaging in abusive litigation conduct); Willging, supra, at 531–
33 (“About half of [the litigation] cost was due to discovery.”).  It merits note that measuring discovery 
costs as a percentage of litigation costs may be misleading due to the rapid decline of cases proceeding 
to trial, such that discovery has become a greater focal point of most cases.  See PAUL W. GRIMM ET 
AL., DISCOVERY PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS, at xi (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the declining 
number of cases proceeding to trial, and highlighting the importance of modern discovery tactics).  See 
generally Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small Changes 
Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495, 501–05 (2013) (emphasizing how the 
decline in trials, expenses, delays, changes in law, and the scope of discovery are dramatically affecting 
the civil justice system).  Indeed, discovery “often ‘can become an end in itself.’”  Id. at 496 (quoting 
JOINT PROJECT OF AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT, at 2 (2009)). 
2. Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2000). 
3. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 635 (1989) (citing John K. 
Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 569 (1989)).  The sentiment is not universal.  See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: 
The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1393, 1393–97 (1994) (“[B]elief rested not . . . on reliable empirical research, but rather on the 
myth that Americans overlitigate, especially by abusing discovery.”); Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery 
Abuse? A Comment on John Setear’s the Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649, 649–53 (1989) (“The 
fundamental difference between discovery in litigation and the dynamic of nuclear deterrence should 
be apparent . . . in litigation there is a judge, while in nuclear strategy there is not.”). 
4. See Korte v. Hunter’s Mfg. Co., No. 3:12-cv-791-MJR-DGW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62058, 
at *2–4 (S.D. Ill. May 1, 2013) (“In this particular case, this [c]ourt [found] counsel’s conduct to border 
on unprofessionalism in the length, tenor, and indignation that was displayed in the filings . . . .”); see 
also Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 362–63, 362 n.6 (D. Md. 2008) 
(recognizing advocacy in discovery is constrained by dictates of ethics). 
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common for courts to utilize their inherent, or rule-based authority, to 
sanction parties for conduct without invoking ethics rules.5  As one court 
has noted, “[g]enerally, courts are reluctant to resolve disputes over ethical 
violations that arise during the course of litigation.”6  Nevertheless, as 
attorneys, we are bound to ethical obligations, regardless of whether 
violations pass without comment.7 
One of the foremost commentators on ethics abuses in discovery practice 
identified the dearth of guidance for a process largely controlled by the 
litigants as a leading factor in discovery abuse.8  Since that observation, local 
rules, caselaw, treatises, and even the American Bar Association (ABA) have 
attempted to provide more concrete guidance.9  Still, despite the increase in 
guidance on some areas of discovery, relatively little focus has been paid to 
the ethical implications from misuse of discovery devices.  Even in the 
 
5. See, e.g., Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 142, 149 (Del. 2017) (en banc) (“Although there is no 
single definition of bad faith conduct, courts have found bad faith where parties have unnecessarily 
prolonged or delayed litigation, falsified records[,] or knowingly asserted frivolous claims.” (quoting 
Johnston v. Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG, 720 A.2d 542, 546 (1998))). 
6. Tylena M. v. HeartShare Human Servs., No. 02Civ.8401 (VM)(THK), 2004 WL 1252945, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2004) (“The business of the court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a 
general overseer of the ethics of those who practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the trial 
of the cause before it.” (quoting W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976))).  
Conversely, “disciplinary authorities often defer to the trial courts in policing” conduct in civil 
litigation.  Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42 (1991). 
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“Every 
lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  A lawyer should also aid 
in securing their observance by other lawyers.  Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the 
independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.”); see also id. at r. 3.2 cmt. 1 (“It 
is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar.”). 
8. W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 901 (1996) (citing 
William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 
703, 711 (1989)) (attributing the point to the Honorable William W. Schwarzer, though building 
extensively on his view); see also Grimm & Yellin, supra note 1, at 505–07 (recognizing attorneys’ ethical 
duties conflict with their private duty, and therefore, interfere with the discovery process). 
9. See GRIMM, supra note 1, at 155–56 (providing guidance for counsel on how to respond to an 
inadvertent disclosure under the ABA Model Rules and applicable state law); see also ROGER S. 
HAYDOCK & DAVID F. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE § 1.04, 1-5–1-6 (6th ed. 2014) (“Today, courts 
are continually reviewing the effect of discovery rules and procedures.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, CIVIL 
DISCOVERY STANDARDS 5, 6, 10–12 (1999) (“Many of the practices outlined in this Standard are found 
in Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 and 26(f) and similar provisions in various state court rules and guidelines.” 
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modest literature on the topic,10 there is one facet shown virtually no 
attention: requests for admission.11 
When used properly, requests for admission streamline litigation and 
narrow issues for trial.12  When used for improper purposes, however, 
requests for admission become nothing more than “a trap for the unwary”13 
 
10. See Wendel, supra note 8, at 899–901 (describing the development of a discovery system 
which “impose[s] on lawyers a heavy burden of having to accommodate conflicting expectations” 
(quoting William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 703, 714 (1989))); see also A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L. 
REV. 273, 257–77 (1998) (addressing and proposing solutions to the conflicts attorneys face between 
the indistinct ethical rules and court rules which lead to deposition abuse). 
11. Consistent with the approach taken by the American Law Reports annotation, this Article 
will, unless quoting directly, use the terminology “requests for admission,” and shall not distinguish 
between the various other terms used in rules and caselaw.  See, e.g., Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, 
Permissible Scope, Respecting Nature of Inquiry, of Demand for Admissions Under Modern State Civil Rules of 
Procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489, 492 n.3 (1985) (referring to “request for admission” as “demand for 
admission” and “notice to admit,” noting the only requirement is that they are “designed to elicit 
admissions as to matters”).  Further, throughout, the plural form shall be “requests for admission.”  
Robert K. Wise & Katherine Hendler Fayne, A Guide to Properly Using and Responding to Requests for 
Admission Under the Texas Discovery Rules, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 655, 657–58 n.1 (2014). 
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 36 advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendment (“Rule 36 serves two 
vital purposes, both of which are designed to reduce trial cost. . . .   [F]irst to facilitate proof . . . and 
secondly, to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be.”); Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 
834 F.3d 376, 402 n.26 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Rule 36 provides a tool to streamline the proof of controverted 
facts.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 36)); Dobos v. Ingersoll, 9 P.3d 1020, 1025 n.13 (Alaska 2000) 
(recognizing that requests for admission allow parties to determine the truth of matters prior to trial, 
and also to test the genuineness of documents); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frost, 85 A.3d 264, 
281 (Md. 2014) (agreeing with commentators that requests for admission generally streamline the 
matter by determining the genuineness of documents, identifying facts in dispute, and testing the truth 
of uncontested facts); Torres v. Pabon, 137 A.3d 502, 511 (N.J. 2016) (“Requests for admissions are 
intended to ‘streamline litigation by “weeding out items of fact and proof over which there is no 
dispute . . . .”’” (quoting Hungerford v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 517 A.2d 498, 501 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986))). 
13. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. DHL Worldwide Express NV, No. 00 C 1532, 2001 WL 
55460, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2001) (illustrating the technicalities of requests for admission under 
Rule 36, particularly the specificity of an answer to an admission request, and stating that in this case 
“Rule 36 is not a trap for the unwary”); Lopez v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 798, 802 (Ct. App. 
1986) (“The obvious purpose of the requirement that the statutory warning be given is to avoid the 
use of section 2033 as a trap for the unwary.”); S. Jarret Raab, Requests for Admission in Illinois: No Longer 
a Trap for the Unwary, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 743, 745 (2008) (discussing a case where the plaintiff was 
denied the ability to amend his deficient responses, thus the deficient answers were deemed admitted 
even though the court acknowledged carelessness could be a factor (citing Robbins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
841 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), overruled by Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065 
(Ill. 2007))); Blake Shuart, Requests for the Admission of Facts: Compliance with Supreme Court Rule 216 After 
Brookbank v. Olson, C.B.A. REC., May 2009 at 42, 45 (“Rule 216 remains a trap for the unwary—or 
disadvantaged—attorney who is faced with a request to admit when his or her client is nowhere to be 
found.”); see also Hadra v. Herman Blum Consulting Eng’rs, 74 F.R.D. 113, 114 (N.D. Tex. 1977) 
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or, as one commentator puts it, “a ticking time bomb.”14  That is because a 
request is deemed admitted if not timely answered.15  Under the federal 
rules, unless ordered otherwise, a response must be made within thirty days 
of service.16 
As most litigators have experienced, often the apparent purpose of 
tendered requests is nothing more than “the hope that [the recipient will] 
not answer and that his failure to answer could be used to seek judgment 
against him.”17  And even when not merely a trap, requests seeking 
 
(“This court is reluctant to see Rule 36 procedures serve as a snare for the unwary.”).  But see Amy Luria 
& John E. Clabby, An Expense Out of Control: Rule 33 Interrogatories After the Advent of Initial Disclosures and 
Two Proposals for Change, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 29, 47 (2005) (contending that parties answering requests for 
admission are actually “more careful to avoid traps” than parties responding to interrogatories). 
14. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Requests for Admission in Wisconsin Procedure: Civil Litigation’s Double-Edged 
Sword, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 668–69 (1995) (quoting Shirley Engel, Requests for Admission—A Discovery 
Trap: A Review of California Code of Civil Procedure 2033, 18 U.W.L.A. L. REV. 61, 61 (1986)); see also 
Freshman, Mulvaney, Comsky, Kahan & Deutsch v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 533, 540 (Ct. App. 
1985) (“No party with responses to a request for admission filed even one day late could ever be free 
of the danger of the opponent ‘dropping the bomb’ sometime before the trial.”). 
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3); see also Raab, supra note 13, at 743 (“In Illinois, as with most other 
jurisdictions, an untimely or procedurally defective response to a formal request to admit will result in 
factual admissions that can have dire consequences to the offending party’s case.”).  Requests may also 
be deemed admitted if the response is found inadequate.  See Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 671 (“A 
‘deemed’ admission occurs when the responding party fails to timely respond to the request or when a 
trial court, in ruling on a motion regarding the sufficiency of a response to a request for admission, 
deems the request admitted because the response does not comply with the Texas Rule 198’s 
requirements.”).  To combat that danger, some jurisdictions require a warning regarding failure to 
answer.  See Helbig v. Comm’r, No. 8011-06, 2008 WL 4735396, at *2 n.3 (T.C. Oct. 29, 2008) 
(explaining that the rules regarding requests for admission had been amended to provide the 
consequences for failing to respond to a request because the current rule could be “a trap for the 
unwary”); see also Diggs v. Keller, 181 F.R.D. 468, 469 (D. Nev. 1998) (requiring disclosure of 
consequences for failure to respond to requests for pro se prisoner litigants); Lopez, 223 Cal. Rptr. 
at 800 (noting the request for admission procedures required a warning be placed at the end of the 
request). 
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3).  In state courts, timing may vary or depend on circumstances.  See, 
e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 804.11(1)(b) (West 2017) (expanding the deadline from thirty days to forty-five 
days if requests were served with the summons and complaint). 
17. Hungerford, 517 A.2d at 501; see also United States v. $23,940.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 3:14-
CV-01226 (VLB), 2015 WL 7295430, at *3 (D. Conn. Nov. 18, 2015) (“[T]he requests for admissions 
were little more than a deadline trap for the unobservant claimant.”); Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc., 
212 F.R.D. 73, 81 & n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Even though the requests were more intelligible, the Court 
senses a trap is laid for the unwary in many of them.  The synergy of this litigation, as indicated by 
these pleadings, borders more on brinkmanship and sharp practice than anything else.”); Vision Point 
of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065, 1076 n.4 (Ill. 2007) (recognizing, among critics of harsh 
application, an article “questioning ‘whether the point of Rule 216 is to obtain information or to set a 
trap in hope of winning by default’” (quoting Shawn Wood, An Inconvenient Truthiness About Rule 216, 
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admissions that the party does not reasonably believe will be admitted serve 
to increase costs and hamper the goal of a “just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”18  Remarkably, however, 
courts and commentators do not consider whether attempts to prevent 
decisions on the merits or extend costs through such pure procedural 
gamesmanship constitute ethical violations.19 
The purpose of this Article is to expose the often-overlooked abuse of 
requests for admission, in which the party tendering the requests does so in 
order to do nothing more than circumvent a decision on the merits through 
gamesmanship, burden the recipient, or increase billable hours.  The focus 
is on three common circumstances: (1) where the requests are tendered at a 
time and in a manner as to intentionally maximize the possibility that they 
will not be timely answered; (2) where the content or volume of the requests 
is improper; and (3) where the requests serve no defensible purpose, thereby 
needlessly increasing an attorney’s own client’s costs.  An important caveat 
is that those do not include requests that are properly sought so as to later 
permit invocation of rules that allow recovery of costs and fees for later 
 
CHI. LAW., Dec. 2006, at 26, 62)).  In at least one instance, the ease of abusing requests led a pro se 
plaintiff to obtain a $30,000 judgment against a pro se defendant, which was reversed on appeal.  See 
Costello v. Zavodnik, 55 N.E.3d 348, 353–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“He did not send requests claiming 
$30,000 and $300,000 and $600,000 in damages because he believes those figures are legally justified 
and thought [Defendant] might agree; he sent them because he hoped [Defendant] would not respond, 
rendering the matters admitted by operation of Rule 36.”).  The Rules of Professional Conduct, 
however, do not apply to pro se parties.  Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 267 (Ind. 2014) (per 
curiam). 
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
19. See generally United States ex rel. Thomas v. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., No. 11–
2475–DDC, 2014 WL 2095168, at *7 (D. Kan. May 20, 2014) (“Given the relevant Rule 36 analysis, 
the court finds it unnecessary to agree or disagree with defense counsel’s highly charged accusations 
about plaintiffs’ counsel engaging in conduct that was ‘underhanded’ and ‘unbecoming of the ethical 
practice of law.’”); Kinsler, supra note 14 (addressing professional discipline only for failure to timely 
or sufficiently respond); Raab, supra note 13 (discussing potential abuse of requests for admission as a 
procedural trap, however, failing to mention any ethical implications that may arise); Renee H. Tobias, 
Deemed Admissions: Tool, Trap or Both?, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 709, 715 (1994) (“[C]ourts have stated that 
good cause is ‘the threshold issue which must be determined by the trial judge before considering the 
other requirements set forth in the rule’ . . . .” (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. Greene, 824 S.W.2d 697, 
699 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied))); Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 727–32 (“The 
withdrawal of an admission ‘subserves’ the presentation of the action’s merits when upholding the 
admission would practically or effectively eliminate presentation of the action’s merits.” (citing Wheeler 
v. Greene, 157 S.W.3d 439, 443 n.2 (Tex. 2005); Rodriguez v. Kapilivsky, No. 13–11–00796–CV, 
2012 WL 7849308, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 13, 2012, no pet.); Wells v. Best Ins. Servs., 
Inc., No. 13–09–00236–CV, 2010 WL 4264792, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 28, 2010, no 
pet.))). 
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establishing as true or authentic what was already requested to be 
admitted.20 
In federal court, requests for admission are generally governed by Rule 36 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.21  Although the states have not 
uniformly adopted the federal rules, the majority of jurisdictions have 
implemented procedures mirroring the federal discovery rules.22 Many 
other states have adopted provisions permitting use of requests for 
admission in civil proceedings.23  Because the closest approach to a 
 
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2); see also ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (“If a party fails to admit what is 
requested under Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves the matter true—including the 
genuineness of a document—the requesting party may move that the non-admitting party pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in making that proof.”); IND. R. TRIAL P. 37(C) 
(allowing the requesting party to seek attorneys’ fees and reasonable expenses if a genuine document 
is not admitted under the rule); OHIO R. CIV. P. 37(C)(2) (providing the requesting party with a 
mechanism for seeking reasonable expenses after proving the genuineness or truth of the matter 
asserted).  Notably, rules that mirror Federal Rule 37(c)(2) specifically require that the party denying 
the request do so without “reasonable ground to believe that it might prevail on the matter.”  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 37(c)(2)(C); see also Hillside Prods., Inc. v. Cty. of Macomb, No. 06–11566, 2009 WL 3059147, 
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 24, 2009) (recognizing that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 36 and 37 “allows 
for an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in cases in which a party does not comply with 
Rule 36” (quoting Kasuri v. St. Elizabeth Hosp. Med. Ctr., 897 F.2d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 1990))); Dobos 
v. Ingersoll, 9 P.3d 1020, 1025–26 (Alaska 2000) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2)) (referring to Rule 36 
which provides that the requesting party may apply for recovery of reasonable expenses, but the court 
must also consider whether the failing party had a reasonable belief that it would ultimately prevail, 
even if it did not); Hewitt v. Felderman, 841 N.W.2d 258, 265 (S.D. 2013) (“The mere fact that a matter 
was later proved at trial does not establish that the party denying the admission was unreasonable in 
believing they might prevail on the matter.” (citing Richardson v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 540 N.W.2d 
696, 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam))). 
21. See In re Air Crash at Charlotte, 982 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 n.5 (D.S.C. 1996) (“Requests for 
admission are governed by Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”); see also Burdick v. 
Koerner, 179 F.R.D. 573, 576 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (“Requests for admission are governed by 
Rule 36 . . . .”).  Requests for admission are also governed, in part, by Federal Rules 26, 37(a)(5), 
and 37(c)(2).  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“For good cause, the court may order discovery of any 
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”); id. R. 37(a)(5)(A) (“[T]he court must . . . 
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising 
that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, 
including attorney’s fees.”); id. R. 37(c)(2) (establishing the sanctions a court may impose on a party 
who has failed to provide required admissions under Rule 36). 
22. Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and their state counterparts, 
are generally referred to as “the discovery rules.”  Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 
354, 357 (D. Md. 2008). 
23. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984) (recognizing the adoption of 
provision similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by most states (citing FLEMING JAMES, JR. 
ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 169 (1965))); see also Morgan Cloud, Privileges Lost? Privileges Retained?, 
69 TENN. L. REV. 65, 68 (2001) (“In the decades following the adoption of the 1938 Federal Rules, 
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common ground is through the federal rules, the primary focus of this 
Article will be on requests for admission under rules substantially similar to 
Federal Rule 36 (Rule 36)—however, citations to and discussions of the 
state rules and procedures will occur throughout. 
Similarly, codes and rules of ethical conduct can vary across state lines.24  
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions have adopted, to varying degrees, the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.25  Again, in a search for common 
ground, this Article will focus on the ABA Model Rules with limited citation 
to state authority implementing state rules patterned on the Model Rules. 
I.    BRIEF OVERVIEW & HISTORY OF DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN AMERICA 
In understanding the ethical difficulties posed in discovery, it is important 
to view discovery proceedings through the context of history.  Historically, 
discovery was virtually non-existent.26  “At common law there was no 
 
most states adopted discovery schemes modeled after the federal plan . . . .”); Seymour Moskowitz, 
Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 602 (2002) 
(recapping the effect of the adoption of the Federal Rules, which “marked a new approach and epoch” 
for many civil litigations); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey 
of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1378–1425 (1986) (comparing state civil 
procedures for discovery to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and noting that most mirror the 
federal approach); Raab, supra note 13, at 743 (recognizing the procedures adopted in Illinois, like most 
other states, mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure approach).  As noted, many of these states 
have adopted procedures which permit requests for admission in civil proceedings.  ALASKA R. CIV. 
P. 36; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 216; IND. R. TRIAL P. 36; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3123 (MCKINNEY 2009); TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 198; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 804.11 (West 2017).  But see Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism 
in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making 
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1172–74, 1184–88 (2005) (identifying a trend of states implementing 
discovery procedures distinct from the federal rules). 
24. See generally Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal 
Court Practice, 58 S.M.U. L. REV. 3, 5–7 (2005) (discussing the complexity of non-uniform 
implementation of ethics rules across jurisdictions). 
25. Stephen E. Kalish, An Instrumental Interpretation of Model Rule 1.7(a) in the Corporate Family 
Situation: Unintended Consequences in Pandora’s Box, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 38 n.1 (1998) (“This 
Article will focus on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; most jurisdictions have adopted 
them.”).  See generally State Rules Comparison Charts, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/policy/rule_charts.html [http://perma.cc/LTC7-NHR5] 
(“[M]aterials show how each jurisdiction has modified . . . each of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”). 
26. See HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 1.04, 1-5 (“The early days of dispute resolution in 
America involved little discovery. . . .  There was nothing generations ago resembling our current 
discovery, motion, and practice events.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694–95 (1998) [hereinafter Fishing 
Expeditions] (“Historically, discovery had been extremely limited in both England and the United 
States.”). 
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provision for discovery because the adversarial system of litigation 
permitted each party to deal with his opponent at arm’s length and to resist 
supplying information or evidence in his possession.”27  Under the 
common law, the written pleading was generally the only pretrial source for 
information.28  If the pleading was unclear, a defendant could seek a bill of 
particulars to obtain further factual information so as to allow the defendant 
to come to trial prepared for the case against him.29  Consequently, the bill 
proved to be more akin to a pleading than discovery.30 
The lone tools resembling modern pre-trial discovery rested in the hands 
of chancery courts.31  Although entrusted to equity, “a party in an action at 
common law could exhibit a bill in the Court of Chancery for the purpose 
of discover[ing] material evidence to be used in the trial of their existing 
common law action.”32  In that way, the equitable bill of discovery served 
as an auxiliary to the common law courts.33  Even for a task as vital as 
preserving the testimony of a witness who may decease prior to trial, or of 
one who resided abroad, litigants were permitted to obtain depositions by 
writing or interrogatories de bene esse only through the authority of the 
chancery court.34 
By modern sensibilities, a highly-limited discovery practice may seem 
manifestly unjust.  Although practical considerations certainly buttressed 
 
27. 22 STEPHEN E. ARTHUR, INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES: CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE § 21.1, 394 
(2d ed. 2007). 
28. GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 1 (1932); see also Fishing Expeditions, 
supra note 26, at 695 (“Nor was there much need for discovery at the later period of the common law 
when the pleadings assumed such a critical role.”). 
29. RAGLAND, supra note 28, at 11 (citing Liscomb v. Agate, 4 N.Y.S. 167, 168 (Gen. Term 
1889)). 
30. ARTHUR, supra note 27, at § 21.1, 394. 
31. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (citing RAGLAND, supra note 28, at 13–16). 
32. Robert Hardaway et al., E-Discovery’s Threat to Civil Litigation: Reevaluating Rule 26 for the Digital 
Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 541 (2011) (citing ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 
THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 204 (1952)); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS 1392 (William Draper Lewis ed., Rees 
Welsh & Co. 1898) (1765) (“But, for want of this discovery at law, the courts of equity have acquired 
a concurrent jurisdiction with every court in all matters of account.” (citing Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Cai. 
Cas. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Allen v. Smith, 16 N.Y. 415, 418 (1857); Johnson v. Campbell, 13 Ill. App. 
120, 124 (1883); Yates v. Stuart, 19 S.E. 423, 426 (W. Va. 1894))). 
33. Michael Lobban, Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery, Part II, 
22 L. & HIST. REV. 565, 587 (2004). 
34. BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at 1343. 
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early limitations,35 the primary obstacle to expansive discovery was 
philosophical.  At the core of the opposition was a belief that expansive 
discovery stood as a threat to the adversarial process.36  The ardent belief 
in a combative system was the natural outgrowth of a theologically based 
judicial tradition that sought truth through divine favor, and later evolved 
into “a deep belief in the independence and self-sufficiency of each 
citizen.”37  As Professor Subrin explained, under that view, “[t]he idea that 
one should help opponents prepare their case was distasteful.”38 
Due to the wide-scale adoption of New York’s Field Code (Field 
Code),39 the common law pleadings system was largely supplanted in the 
United States by either code pleading or sufficient statutory incursions into 
the common law so as to render many other states “quasi-code states.”40  
The Field Code acted to merge law and equity courts into a single entity.41  
 
35. “The English barristers were centered in London.  Travel was difficult.  It would not have 
been easy for them to have participated in discovery in the counties where the assizes were held.”  
Fishing Expeditions, supra note 26, at 695.  Some authors have provided an illustrative discussion of 
lawyers and courts in early American society.  See DANIEL WAIT HOWE, THE LAWS AND COURTS OF 
NORTHWEST AND INDIANA TERRITORIES 8–11, 18 (1886) (assessing early practices for fund raising 
to develop a library); Elizabeth R. Osborn, Indiana Courts and Lawyers, 1816–2004, in THE HISTORY OF 
INDIANA LAW 257, 262–65 (David J. Bodenhamer & Randall T. Shepard, eds., 2006) (describing the 
practices of the legal system in the early American West). 
36. Fishing Expeditions, supra note 26, at 695 (citing ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 207 (1952); Edson R. Sunderland, 
Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 866–67 (1993)). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier 
Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 316–17, 327 (1988) [hereinafter The Field Code] (citing CHARLES 
M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL 
REFORM 196–98 (1981)) (“The major goal of the [Field] Code was to expedite the predictable 
enforcement of discretely articulated rights. . . .  Field’s goal was neither dispute resolution nor law 
reform.”). 
40. See CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN 
AMERICA AND ENGLAND §§ 14–15, 15–16 (W. H. Anderson & Co. 1897) (“But not all the remaining 
states are ‘common law states’ even in this loose sense. . . .  For convenience [these non-common law 
states] may be referred to as quasi-code states.”); see also The Field Code, supra note 39, at 330 (“The 
drafters of the Field Code thought it critical that the parties learn each side’s version of the facts 
through the pleadings.”); Fishing Expeditions, supra note 26, at 696 (recognizing the biggest systematic 
change to discovery practice, following the adoption of the common-law standards, was the Field 
Code). 
41. David M. Katz, Note, Assessing the Federal Rules’ Proportionality Amendment: Why Proportionality 
is Philosophically Proper, Yet Practically Problematic, 67 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583, 587–88 (2017) (citing Alan 
K. Goldstein, A Short History of Discovery, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 257, 266–67 (1981)); see also The Field 
Code, supra note 39, at 328 (“The problem for Field and the other commissioners was to describe the 
‘what happened’ and the applicable law in a way that would eliminate the law-equity separation and the 
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An important result of the Field Code was to place discovery devices, such 
as depositions, into the hands of law judges.42  Nevertheless, many of the 
early adopters “overlooked the importance of discovery as such and its 
relation to the general scheme of pleading and pre-trial practice under the 
code,” leaving discovery to be incrementally expanded later in many code 
jurisdictions.43 
Although ostensibly expanding the role of discovery in courts of law, 
“[t]he Field Code eliminated equitable bills of discovery, and interrogatories 
as part of the equitable bill.”44  The philosophy of the Field Code’s 
namesake, David Dudley Field, still placed a great deal of emphasis on 
pleadings and carried a libertarian, individualistic view that resented 
expansive discovery as an unbridled “fishing expedition.”45 
Federal courts, not having adopted the Field Code, remained a fora of 
limited discovery.46  Finally, in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
were adopted, which included the earliest iterations of the modern discovery 
rules.47  Since their enactment, the discovery rules have been amended more 
 
forms of action.”).  Federal courts did not merge law and equity until the enactment of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Alexander Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New 
Federal Procedure, 31 CAL. L. REV. 127, 127 (1943). 
42. RAGLAND, supra note 28, at 17–18; Fishing Expeditions, supra note 26, at 696–97. 
43. RAGLAND, supra note 28, at 18. 
44. Fishing Expeditions, supra note 26, at 696 (quoting The Field Code, supra note 39, at 332).  
Federal courts continued to embrace the overlap with chancery discovery until the enactment of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Ryan W. Scott, Note, Minimum Contacts, No Dog: Evaluating Personal 
Jurisdiction for Nonparty Discovery, 88 MINN. L. REV. 968, 971–72 (2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26 
advisory committee’s note to subdivision (a)) (noting the bill of discovery was not displaced until the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
45. Fishing Expeditions, supra note 26, at 697 (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE 
RANGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL, at iii (1932)). 
46. Id. at 698–701. 
47. Grimm & Yellin, supra note 1, at 507. 
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than a dozen times.48  As a product of a notice-pleading structure,49 the 
federal rules instituted broad, liberal discovery, which was largely foreign to 
American practice at that point.50  States soon followed suit.51 
Despite centuries of change, the philosophy of zealous, singular-minded 
advocacy still carries weight.52  That philosophy, once an obstacle to the 
 
48. Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and the 
Resolution of Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 726 n.33 
(2012); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (amending Rule 26 twelve times since its adoption in 1937).  Some 
have criticized that the amendments to the rules of discovery occur too frequently.  See Scott M. 
O’Brien, Note, Analog Solutions: E-Discovery Spoliation Sanctions and the Proposed Amendments to FRCP 37(E), 
65 DUKE L.J. 151, 156 (2015) (“Since their inception in 1938, the rules of discovery have been revised 
with what some view as distressing frequency.” (quoting Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to 
How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 228 (2010))).  In a publication 
by Wright, Miller, and Marcus, a narrative of Rule 36 describes the changes since its adoption.  
8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2251, 318–20 (2010). 
49. John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 534–35 
(2000) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF 
FEDERAL COURTS 468 (5th ed. 1994); Patrick E. Higginbotham, General Provisions Governing Discovery: 
Duty of Disclosure, in 6 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.02, 26-26 (3d ed. 2000)); Roberta M. 
Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis of a Consequence of Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 465, 480 n.83 (1993). 
50. See generally Fishing Expeditions, supra note 26, at 702–39, 720 n.165 (“This momentum toward 
what the drafters called ‘liberal’ discovery gained yet more momentum in the decade after the federal 
rules became law, which resulted in even greater liberalization of many of the discovery rules in 1946.”).  
In Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court called for a liberal discovery practice under Rule 26.  See 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947) (“It is said that inquiry may be made under these rules, 
epitomized by Rule 26, as to any relevant matter which is not privileged; and since the discovery 
provisions are to be applied as broadly and liberally as possible, the privilege limitation must be 
restricted to its narrowest bounds.”).  Interestingly, this practice did not explicitly expand beyond 
depositions until the 1970 amendments.  Christine L. Childers, Note, Keep on Pleading: The Co-Existence 
of Notice Pleading and the New Scope of Discovery Standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 36 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 677, 688–90 (2002) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note; 6 JAMES WM. 
MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 2000)); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology 
in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 538 (2001) (acknowledging that discovery 
“was not the general metastructure” that it is now). 
51. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984) (acceding most states have 
adopted rules following those in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  Since many states have adopted 
procedures similar to those adopted in the Federal Rules; States now have liberal discovery provisions, 
following the federal rule’s broad interpretations. 
52. See generally Beckerman, supra note 49, at 523–24 (agreeing that “[a] lawyer ‘[must also] act 
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf’” (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017))); 
Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The “z” Words and Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief 
Justices’ Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 570 (2002) (“Zealous advocacy is the modern day plague which 
infects and weakens the truth-finding process and makes a mockery of the lawyers’ claim to officer of 
the court status.’” (quoting Kathleen P. Browe, Comment, A Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo 
Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 767 (1994))). 
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creation of formal discovery procedures, now stands as a leading factor in 
the problems that plague its practice.  The shift into the federal discovery 
rules did not extinguish pre-rules sensibilities.  In the seminal case Hickman 
v. Taylor,53 which did much to elevate discovery practice to its modern 
import,54 the concurrence of Justice Robert H. Jackson showed trepidation 
toward the shifting landscape: 
Counsel for the petitioner candidly said on argument that he wanted this 
information to help prepare himself to examine witnesses, to make sure he 
overlooked nothing.  He bases his claim to it in his brief on the view that the 
Rules were to do away with the old situation where a law suit developed into 
“a battle of wits between counsel.”  But a common law trial is and always 
should be an adversary proceeding.  Discovery was hardly intended to enable 
a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits 
borrowed from the adversary. 
The real purpose and the probable effect of the practice ordered by the district 
court would be to put trials on a level even lower than a “battle of wits.”  I 
can conceive of no practice more demoralizing to the Bar than to require a 
lawyer to write out and deliver to his adversary an account of what witnesses 
have told him.55 
But, as Professor Wendel has argued, and many others have agreed, 
discovery is a process that sits in contrast to the adversarial stages of 
litigation.56  The distinct nature of discovery, routed in its history, has 
 
53. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
54. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 1.04, 1-6 (“After the seminal discovery case of 
Hickman v. Taylor in 1947, discovery gradually became an essential and recognized method of extracting 
information from opponents.” (footnote omitted)); see also Fishing Expeditions, supra note 26, at 692 
(“The Hickman v. Taylor quotation demonstrates how far attitudes about discovery had changed 
between 1932 and 1946.”). 
55. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).  The specific practice at issue was a court 
order that required counsel to turn over his notes from an interview with a witness.  Id. at 499–500 
(majority opinion).  Hickman established the work-product doctrine to prevent such disclosures.  Fishing 
Expeditions, supra note 26, at 735 (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 509–14). 
56. See Wendel, supra note 8, at 899–901 (identifying “profound structural tension within the 
discovery system” (citing Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 43 
(1989); William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 703, 711, 714 (1989); Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Discovery, 
36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 19 (1988))); see also Beckerman, supra note 49, at 520–23 (recognizing that the 
adversarial nature present in discovery is a continuation of the conflict which brought the parties to 
court in the first place (citing RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE 
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subjected attorneys to ethical challenges occasioned by service of competing 
masters: the court’s truth-seeking function and the client’s interest in 
achieving a favorable, even if unjust, resolution.57 
II.    PURPOSE & SCOPE OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
As part of the original federal discovery rules, requests for admission are 
generally viewed as a facet of discovery.58  But, in many ways, “[r]equests 
for [a]dmission are not a discovery device.”59  As one court remarked, “The 
 
LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 63 (1996))); Ronald N. Boyce, The New 
Federal Discovery Rules: 26(1)&(2)––A Big Step in the Right Direction, UTAH B.J., Winter 1998, at 16, 17 
(“The adversary system in the discovery stage is subordinated to the obligation for truth.” (citing 
Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993))); Grimm & Yellin, supra note 1, 
at 524–33 (“[T]he sad reality is that if you ask anyone familiar with how litigation actually takes place 
in state and federal courts whether cooperation between the parties during discovery is commonplace, 
they will tell you with near unanimity that it is not.”); Harris, supra note 52, at 570–72 (“Wendel 
criticizes what he calls the ‘old school’ argument that . . . civil discovery procedures are part and parcel of the 
adversary system of litigation . . . .” (quoting Wendel, supra note 8, at 929)); Suzanne L. McRobbie, 
Comment, Move Over Work Product—It’s Time for Some Real Discovery: A Call for a Cost-Allocating Amendment 
to Rule 26(b)3, 54 EMORY L.J. 1407, 1408 (2005) (agreeing modern discovery practice has allowed 
lawyers to spend months and many billable hours on pre-trial procedure); E. Stewart Moritz, The Lawyer 
Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks: Reconsidering the Contemporaneous Objection Requirement in Depositions, 72 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1353, 1388–90 (2004) (“[A]dversary theory was misapplied to fact-gathering in the first 
place.” (quoting John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 866 
(1985))). 
57. See Dickerson, supra note 10, at 275–76 (“[S]elf-regulation can be difficult in a system that 
expects lawyers to represent their clients’ interests zealously while serving as quasi-official judicial 
officers.” (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017))); David 
R. Hague, Fraud on the Court and Abusive Discovery, 16 NEV. L.J. 707, 713 (2016) (“[O]ne reason for 
[attorney misconduct] is the tension inherent in the discovery process.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Alex B. Long, Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professionalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble 
Damages, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 423 (2010))); Wendel, supra note 8, at 899–901 (signifying that 
the discovery process “impose[s] on lawyers a heavy burden of having to accommodate conflicting 
expectations” (quoting William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 714 (1989))).  See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing 
Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing the different roles and conceptualizations 
attorneys may take in the discovery process). 
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1) (“A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)—or who 
has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission—must supplement 
or correct its disclosure or response . . . .”); Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 747 (“Requests for 
admission are an extremely effective discovery tool when used and responded to properly.”). 
59. Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997); 
accord Misco, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 205–06 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Requests for admissions 
are not a general discovery device.” (citing WRIGHT, supra note 48, at § 2253, 706 n.23)); Nguyen v. 
Winter, 756 F. Supp. 2d 128, 129 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Requests for [a]dmission are not a discovery device 
but are designed to narrow the issues for trial.” (citing McFadden v. Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & 
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essential function of requests for admission is to establish ‘facts,’ not to 
discover them.”60  The Advisory Committee for the 1970 amendments to 
Federal Rule 36 identified “two vital purposes, both of which are designed 
to reduce trial time.  Admissions are sought, first to facilitate proof with 
respect to issues that cannot be eliminated from the case, and secondly, to 
narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be.”61  Put another way, 
“requests for admission are used to establish admission of facts about which 
there is no real dispute.”62 
Often, litigants will tender all discovery, including request for admission, 
“‘up front,’ in a sweeping discovery request that demands full production all 
at once.”63  Although, perhaps, merely inadvisable for other discovery 
devices,64 that approach is flatly antithetical to the purpose of requests for 
admission, in most cases.65  In order to serve its intended function, the rule 
“presupposes that the party proceeding under it knows the facts or has the 
 
Ingersoll, LLP, 243 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2007))).  Contra Kinsler, supra note 14, at 34–35 (calling it a 
“misconception” that requests for admission “are not true discovery procedures”). 
60. Brown v. Dobbs, 691 N.E.2d 907, 909 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing F.W. Means & Co. v. 
Carstens, 428 N.E.2d 251, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)). 
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 36 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.  Of course, requests for 
admission may also be useful in pretrial motions practice, such as summary judgment.  See CHARLES 
B. KORNMANN, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (N.D. & C.D. S.D. 2013), available at 
http://www.sdd.uscourts.gov/sites/sdd/files/local_rules/northernandcentraldivision_SOP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3GXV-VSNJ] (“Be sure you are not premature in filing a motion for summary 
judgment without considering the use of requests for admissions and other economical discovery 
devices designed to reveal whether any material facts are actually and in good faith in dispute.”). 
62. Claudia Wilken & Robert M. Bloom, Requests for Admission, in 7 MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 36.02[1] (3d ed. 2017). 
63. Grimm & Yellin, supra note 1, at 518. 
64. Judge Grimm and Mr. Yellin assert that early sweeping discovery “necessarily increases the 
costs and burdens on the producing party.”  Id. 
65. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[A], 30-5 (“It is usually inappropriate for a 
plaintiff to submit requests shortly after a complaint is answered and demand that the defendant 
promptly answer them, as the defendant is quite likely unable to perceive what facts should or should 
not be contested at this early stage.” (citing Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2002))).  
Presumably, Mr. Herr and Professor Haydock’s advice is equally applicable to a defendant who seeks 
admissions that contradict the recently filed complaint. 
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document and merely wishes its opponent to concede their genuineness.”66  
It was “not designed to obtain facts or information.”67 
Generally, requests for admission are the last step in a well-crafted, 
phased discovery plan.68  “The conventional wisdom on requests for 
admission is to use them near the end of discovery to double-check the 
completeness of your factual investigation.”69  However, some convincingly 
advocate for structured use throughout the litigation with multiple sets of 
requests.70  Whatever the approach, requests should be used as part of a 
 
66. WRIGHT, supra note 48, at §§ 2253, 2254, 324–31 (2010) (“Indeed unless the requesting 
party knows what the fact is it will not be in a position to make a request about it.”); see also JENNER & 
BLOCK LLP, MOORE’S ANSWERGUIDE FEDERAL DISCOVERY PRACTICE § 13.03[6], 13-9 (2015 ed.) 
(“Note that requests for admission under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 are not intended principally as a discovery 
device, but rather presuppose that the propounding party knows the facts set forth or possesses the 
documents about which the party seeks concession of genuineness.” (citing Safeco of Am. v. Rawstron, 
181 F.R.D. 441, 445 (C.D. Cal. 1998))); Kinsler, supra note 14, at 631 (finding underuse of requests for 
admission is attributable to the misconception regarding their legitimacy as a discovery tool). 
67. Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 659–60. 
68. See LAURIE E. LEADER, WAGES AND HOURS: LAW & PRACTICE § 14.04[3], 14-27–14-28 
(LexisNexis 2017) (discussing the different options available to counsel when preparing a discovery 
plan, including requests for admission); JAMES W. MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY’S LITIGATION 35–39 
(1995) (emphasizing that all discovery tools should be used together, and requests for admission are 
merely used to “fill in any gaps” left after other methods have been utilized); see also WRIGHT, supra 
note 48, at § 2251, 318–20 (tracing the origin of Rule 36 to Equity Rule 58, which permitted a demand 
for admission to be served ten days before trial).  But see Schoenholtz v. Doniger, No. 83 Civ. 2740 
(IBC), 1984 WL 374, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1984) (“Defendants waited ten months from the 
institution of this suit and one month prior to the discovery deadline (three and one half weeks after 
we set the deadline) to file their extensive and frivolous requests for admission. . . .  Defendants do not 
set forth any plausible excuse which would explain their delay in seeking these requests.”); WRIGHT, 
supra note 48, at § 2253, 325 n.4 (“When [‘]admissions are desired upon matters that will probably not 
be in dispute, it is better to proceed by requesting admissions[’] than by serving interrogatories.” 
(quoting Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 22 F.R.D. 494, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1958))).  An arguable 
utility to sending early requests for admission is to trigger an obligation for later in the litigation.  
Rule 26(e)(1) requires supplementation of requests for admission.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1).  Thus, even 
if a request was properly denied initially, failure to supplement once the denial has become 
unreasonable may provide a basis for sanctions under Rule 37(c)(2).  Longoria v. Cty. of Dallas, 
No. 3:14-cv-3111-L, 2016 WL 6893625, slip op. at *8 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2016); Lynn v. Monarch 
Recovery Mgmt., 285 F.R.D. 350, 364 (D. Md. 2012); see also LOCAL RULES OF COURT, LOCAL CIVIL 
RULES 36.01 (M.D. TENN. 2016), available at http://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/files/LocalRules-
20120425.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA99-7KCD] (“[A]dmissions shall be supplemented no later than 
thirty (30) days before trial . . . .”).  But cf. WRIGHT, supra note 48, at § 2264, 399–400 (2010) (resolving 
an apparent conflict between Rule 26(e)(1) duty to supplement and Rule 36(b) which requires a party 
that experiences changes in circumstance to seasonably seek leave from the court to amend). 
69. Kinsler, supra note 14, at 638 (citing THEODORE Y. BLUMOFF ET AL., PRETRIAL 
DISCOVERY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT § 10.1, 349 (1993)). 
70. Id. at 637 (citing Mark A. Dombroff, Requests for Admissions: Weighing the Pros and Cons, TRIAL, 
June 1983, at 82, 85). 
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“party’s overall litigation plan,”71 and should be the product of 
“considerable thought.”72 
The permissible scope of content for requests varies dramatically across 
state lines and can be subject to seemingly contradictory interpretations, 
even among courts applying the exact same rules.  Before the 1970 
amendments, a majority of courts applying Rule 36 concluded that requests 
could address neither the ultimate facts of the case nor issues or opinions of 
law.73  The 1970 amendments are generally thought to have expanded the 
scope, allowing requests to admit opinions and ultimate facts.74  But some 
debate remains,75 and some courts view deemed admissions regarding 
 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 637 n.85 (citing JOHN HARDIN YOUNG & TERRI A ZALL, MASTERING WRITTEN 
DISCOVERY: INTERROGATORIES, DOCUMENTS, AND ADMISSIONS § 7.26 (2d ed. 1992)). 
73. Id. at 628 (citing WRIGHT, supra note 48, at § 2251, 520–21); see also WRIGHT, supra note 48, 
at § 2251, 319 (“Disagreements among the courts about the proper scope of the rule were resolved.  
These included whether a request was objectionable if it went to a matter of opinion.”); Donaldson, 
supra note 11, at 494 (“Until recently, a typical rule governing requests for admission might authorize 
such requests only as to matters of fact or the genuineness of documents.”). 
74. Kinsler, supra note 14, at 628; Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 666 (citing TEX. R. CIV. 
P. 198.1, 198.2(b)); see also Carney v. IRS (In re Carney), 258 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 36 
allows litigants to request admissions as to a broad range of matters, including ultimate facts, as well as 
applications of law to fact.”). 
75. See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 499 (“[E]ven under such a liberal standard, it would be 
inappropriate to make a demand for admission of certain matters technically or arguably within the 
scope of normal discovery.”); see also Asarco LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00283-EJL-
REB, 2016 WL 1755241, at *12 (D. Idaho May 2, 2016) (“[R]equests for admission should not be used 
to establish facts which are obviously in dispute, to demand that the other party admit the truth of a 
legal conclusion, even if the conclusion is attached to operative facts . . . .” (quoting Tuvalu v. 
Woodford, No. CIV S-04-1724 DFL KJM P, 2006 WL 3201096, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006))); 
Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997) 
(“[R]equests for admission are not to be employed as a means ‘to establish facts which are obviously 
in dispute or to answer questions of law.’” (quoting Kosta v. Connolly, 709 F. Supp. 592, 594 (E.D. Pa. 
1989))); Whitaker v. Belt Concepts of Am., Inc. (In re Olympia Holding Corp.), 189 B.R. 846, 853 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (“Three of plaintiff’s requests for admission directly request the defendant to 
admit or deny whether the defendant is not a small business.  These requests clearly require the 
defendant to admit a crucial issue in the dispute. . . .  The Court finds that the requests were improperly 
propounded to force the defendant to concede a highly contested factual issue prior to trial.” (citation 
omitted)); Kosta, 709 F. Supp. at 594 (“We should not employ [Fed. R. 36] to establish facts which are 
obviously in dispute or to answer questions of law.” (citing Driver v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473, 
475 (E.D. Pa. 1959))); Hungerford v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 517 A.2d 498, 501 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (finding admissions of ultimate facts to be patently unfair); Burnside 
v. Foglia, 617 N.Y.S.2d 921, 921 (App. Div. 1994) (“Requests for admissions with respect to contested 
facts that go to the very essence of the dispute [are] palpably improper . . . .”); Time Warner, Inc. v. 
Gonzalez, 441 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (holding admissions are 
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ultimate issues as requiring greater scrutiny when considering whether to 
permit amendment or withdrawal.76 
Beyond the realm of debate, however, is that requests may not seek pure 
admissions of law.77  Because requests may generally seek admissions of 
application of law to facts,78 the dividing line can be erratic.79  An 
illustrative example is a comparison between two Wisconsin decisions.80  In 
Schmid v. Olsen,81 the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority held that a pre-trial 
request for the defendant to admit it was seventy-percent at fault for the 
accident was a proper request.82  The dissent insisted that the decision 
subverted the purpose of requests for admission, created a perverse 
incentive for abuse, and required the defendant to presuppose a conclusion 
properly left for a trier of fact.83 
 
improper when used to prove the ultimate issue in the case (citing Cedyco Corp. v. Whitehead, 
253 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied))); Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 666–
68 (disfavoring the use of admissions for ultimate fact questions). 
76. See, e.g., Bezi v. Camacho, No. SACV 11-00677-JLS (DTB), 2016 WL 4870469, slip op. at *5 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (“[T]he [c]ourt must carefully scrutinize the requests at issue and the resulting 
deemed admissions since the requests at issue here concern ultimate issues to be decided in this 
case . . . .” (citing Whitsitt v. City of Tracy, No. 2:10–cv–0528 JAM AC PS, 2014 WL 2091363, at *3 
(E.D. Cal. May 19, 2014); Jefferson v. Perez, No. CIV S–09–3008 GEB CKD P, 2012 WL 671917, 
at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2012))). 
77. Wilken & Bloom, supra note 62, at § 36.10[8], 36-25 (citing United States v. Petroff-Kline, 
557 F.3d 285, 293 (6th Cir. 2009); Thompson v. Beasley, 309 F.R.D. 236, 241 (N.D. Miss. 2015); Currie 
v. United States, 111 F.R.D. 56, 59 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Williams v. Krieger, 61 F.R.D. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973); Benson Tower Condo. Owners Ass’n v. Victaulic Co., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1196 (D. Or. 
2015)); Kinsler, supra note 14, at 647; Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 665 (citing Williams v. Am. First 
Lloyds Ins., No. 02–12–00318–CV, 2013 WL 2631141, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 13, 2013, 
pet. denied)); see also P.R.S. Int’l, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 703 N.E.2d 71, 76–78 (Ill. 1998) (“[I]n 
interpreting Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts have reached the same 
conclusion: requests to admit ultimate facts are permissible, but requests to admit legal conclusions are 
impermissible.”). 
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1)(A). 
79. Scott Moïse, Requests for Admission, S.C. LAW., Sept. 2006, at 44, 44 (citing Currie, 111 F.R.D. 
at 59; Shaheen v. Cty. of Mathews, 579 S.E.2d 162, 170 (Va. 2003)); Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, 
at 665–66. 
80. See Kinsler, supra note 14, at 644–47 (comparing Schmid v. Olsen, 330 N.W.2d 547 
(Wis. 1983), with Bank of Two Rivers v. Zimmer, 334 N.W.2d 230 (Wis. 1983), and Kettner v. 
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. 1988) to emphasize the difficulty involved in drawing 
the line between admissions entitled to binding effects and admissions that are not). 
81. Schmid v. Olsen, 330 N.W.2d 547 (Wis. 1983). 
82. Id. at 551. 
83. Id. at 553–55 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting); Kinsler, supra note 14, at 644 (citing Schmid, 
330 N.W.2d at 553 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting)). 
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Following the footsteps of Schmid was Kettner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins.84  
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals postulated that a defendant’s request to 
admit “the value of the plaintiff’s claim for injuries in this case, taking into 
account his own contributory negligence does not exceed $100,000.00,” was 
improper.85  The opinion distinguished Schmid as having addressed a fixed 
circumstance, not one—like the value of a personal injury claim—which is 
“inherently variable.”86  The court also found shelter in the distinction 
between allowing a request for admission to cap the amount recoverable 
and the use of offers of judgment.87 
In providing guidance to Texas practitioners,88 one source advises: 
The distinction between a request for an admission of law and one for the 
application of law to fact often is not obvious.  One way to determine if the 
request asks for the application of law to fact is to review the pertinent Texas 
pattern jury charge on the issue.  If it is one that the jury would decide, it 
clearly is not a pure question of law.89 
Though a pragmatic test, it does not hold true for Kettner. 
Although carrying the power to easily end a case without any 
consideration for the underlying merits, Rule 36 has “a distinct 
preference . . . for ascertaining the truth and deciding the case on its 
 
84. Kettner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). 
85. Id. at 738, 740. 
86. Id. at 740. 
87. Id. at 739.  In Kettner, the court concluded that there was already “a mechanism through 
which parties can make offers of settlement or judgment and recover costs and interest if the serving 
party ultimately does better at trial than it would have done had the offer been accepted.”  Id.  If such 
requests were permitted, they “would defeat the policy that favors settlement of claims by providing a 
means to evade.”  Id.  Therefore, the parties were creating a conflict between the settlement procedures 
and the discovery procedure of requests for admission.  Id. 
 88. Texas provides substantively identical language to the scope of requests as Wisconsin.  
Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 804.11(1)(a) (West 2017) (“[A] party may serve upon any other party a 
written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters 
within the scope of [§] 804.01(2) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact 
or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the 
request.”), with TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.1 (“A party may serve on another party . . . written requests that 
the other party admit the truth of any matter within the scope of discovery, including statements of 
opinion or fact or of the application of law to fact, or the genuineness of any documents served with 
the request or otherwise made available for inspection and copying.”). 
89. Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 665–66 (footnote omitted). 
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merits.”90  That preference to adjudicate on the merits of the claim is 
embodied in subsection (b) of Rule 36, which permits withdrawal of 
admissions.91  Accordingly, some courts have gone so far as to consider 
whether withdrawal was merited even when the admitting party failed to file 
a motion to withdraw.92  In deciding whether to permit withdrawal, courts 
must always strike a balance between the desire for resolution on the merits 
and recognition that “too liberal sufferance by the court of a litigant’s sloth 
would undermine a valuable policy furthered by Rule 36(a)—the elimination 
of uncontested issues and expedition of trial.”93  The balance can be 
extremely difficult due to the need to keep the case moving,94 which is often 
 
90. Hodges v. Lewis & Lewis, Inc., 2005 WY 134, ¶ 12, 121 P.3d 138, 143 (Wyo. 2005) (citing 
Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b); see also Hodges, 121 P.3d at 143 (noting that the test requires “the party 
seeking to have the admission upheld to show it would be prejudiced by withdrawal or amendment of 
the admission”). 
92. Wilken & Bloom, supra note 62, at § 36.13, 36-45 (citing Chancellor v. Cty. of Detroit, 454 F. 
Supp. 2d 645, 666 (E.D. Mich. 2006)); see also Kennedy v. Nick Corcokius Enters., Inc., No. 9:15-CV-
80642-ROSENBERG/BRANNON, 2015 WL 7253049, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2015) (“The 
Court construes Defendant’s opposition to summary judgment on Item 012 as an attempt to withdraw 
this admission.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b); Lamark v. Laiwalla, No. 12–03034 WSB AC, 2013 WL 
5703614, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2013); Essex Builders Grp., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 
230 F.R.D. 683, 686 (M.D. Fla. 2005))); United States ex rel. Thomas v. Black & Veatch Special Projects 
Corp., No. 11-2475-DDC, 2014 WL 2095168, at *4 (D. Kan. May 20, 2014) (“The court agrees with 
plaintiffs that, technically, a motion to withdraw admissions is what’s contemplated by Rule 36 in this 
situation.  But since the parties have briefed and argued the issues at length within the analytical 
framework of Rule 36, the court has no hesitancy considering the instant motion to strike as a motion 
to withdraw admissions.”); Sunoco, Inc. v. MX Wholesale Fuel Corp., 565 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577 
(D.N.J. 2008) (“[W]e recognize that a disposition on the merits is preferred over a decision based upon 
procedural technicalities.” (citing Petrunich v. Sun Bldg. Sys., Inc., No. 3:CV-04-2234, 2006 WL 
2788208, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2006))).  Contra Broad. Music, Inc. v. Hub at Cobb’s Mill, LLC, 
No. 3:13–CV–01237 (VLB), 2015 WL 1525936, at *5–6 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2015) (finding withdrawal 
of deemed admissions appropriate only upon motion (citing Atl. Sea Pride, Inc. v. McCarthy, No. 1:13–
CV–0670 (LEK), 2013 WL 5652492, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2013))); Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Goodwin, 
422 S.E.2d 76, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (entering summary judgment against pro se defendant who timely 
answered the complaint but failed to timely respond to requests for admission served with the 
complaint). 
93. Hadra v. Herman Blum Consulting Eng’rs, 74 F.R.D. 113, 114 (N.D. Tex. 1977). 
94. Rule 36 is meant to expedite discovery, not just the trial.  See Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. 
Holdings, Inc., 124 F. App’x 169, 172 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of such admissions is to narrow 
the array of issues before the court, and thus expedite both the discovery process and the resolution 
of the litigation.” (citing Carney v. IRS (In re Carney), 258 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2001))); JZ 
Buckingham Invs., LLC v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 37, 44 (2007) (favoring the use of admissions not 
only to expedite the litigation process but also to save time and money in the discovery process (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 36 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment)); see also United States v. Persaud, 
229 F.R.D. 686, 694 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“To release [a party] from his deemed admissions under these 
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best accomplished by holding attorneys to rigid deadlines.95  In striking that 
balance, often the scales will tip in favor of withdrawal if the court concludes 
that Rule 36 was abused.96 
III.    IMPROPER USES OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
When used to further the intended purpose of litigation economy, 
requests for admission are an asset to the legal process.97  But as beneficial 
a tool as it may be, when used for improper purposes, requests for admission 
become a burden on the system.98  Aside from not allowing requests to 
 
circumstances would reward him for abusing the litigation process, would waste precious judicial 
resources, and would subject the United States to manifest inequity.  Enough is enough.”). 
95. Some scholars have pointed out the importance of deadlines for many attorneys, noting that 
many attorneys procrastinate, which suggests cases would move slowly if attorneys were left to their 
own devices.  See Mark Powers et al., Create Balance in Your Life by Becoming Proactive, S.C. LAW., 
Sept. 2004, at 32, 34–35 (“[F]or many attorneys, it is the push they rely upon every day to get the job 
done.”).  Furthermore, they note that “one of the symptoms of excessive reliance on adrenaline is that 
without a pending deadline, you are not motivated to lift a finger.”  Id. at 35. 
96. See Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding a court 
abuses its discretion by denying a motion to withdraw admissions when the court does not follow the 
intent of Rule 36(b) (first citing Smith v. First Nat’l Bank, 837 F.2d 1575, 1577 (11th Cir. 1988); then 
citing Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Trasp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); and then citing Gutting v. 
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 710 F.2d 1309, 1313 (8th Cir. 1983))); see also United States v. $23,940.00 in 
U.S. Currency, No. 3:14-CV-01226 (VLB), 2015 WL 7295430, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 18, 2015) (“In 
exercising its discretion the court should strive to balance the equities, and where the party relying on 
the admission would not be prejudiced, thereby strive to resolve the issue on the merits.”); Costello v. 
Zavodnik, 55 N.E.3d 348, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“[W]e must conclude that the trial court abused 
its discretion when it denied part of Castello’s motion to withdraw his admissions.”). 
97. See Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268–69 (“[W]hen a party uses [Rule 36] to establish uncontested facts 
and to narrow the issues for trial, then the rule functions properly.”); Wilken & Bloom, supra note 62, 
at § 36.02[1], 36-6–36-7 (“[R]equests for admission can save litigants valuable time and substantial 
money, which would otherwise have to be spent unnecessarily either to prove certain facts at trial, or 
to establish certain facts through complex, costly discovery procedures, such as interrogatories, 
depositions, and requests for the production of documents, when such facts are not contested.”); 
WRIGHT, supra note 48, at § 2252, 320–22 (asserting Rule 36 saves time, limits disputed matters at trial, 
promotes efficiency and economy, aids judicial administrators, and makes summary judgment possible 
(first citing Holiday Inns Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); then citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 36 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendments; and then citing Ted Finman, The 
Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 YALE L.J. 371, 376 (1962))). 
98. See Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268–69 (stressing misuse of requests for admission causes Rule 36’s 
time-saving function to cease, by “dragging out the litigation and wasting valuable resources”); Wise & 
Fayne, supra note 11, at 658 (“[R]equests for admission are a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, 
they can streamline the action and reduce its costs, whereas, on the other hand, they can result in virtual 
ruin when a party fails to timely or properly respond to them.”). 
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admit pure issues of law,99 the three most common circumstances in which 
requests for admission are deemed improper are: (1) when a court may 
ascertain bad faith in sending the requests, (2) the number of requests is 
unreasonable, and (3) the requesting party could not have reasonably 
believed that the request would be admitted.100 
A. Requests Made in Bad Faith 
Perhaps the most frequently cited case in which the court found bad faith 
is Perez v. Miami-Dade County.101  Having found ill intent in sending requests 
for admission alongside the complaint,102 the Eleventh Circuit commented: 
When a party like Perez . . . uses the rule to harass the other side or . . . with 
the wild-eyed hope that the other side will fail to answer and therefore admit 
essential elements (that the party has already denied in its answer), the rule’s 
time-saving function ceases; the rule instead becomes a weapon, dragging out 
the litigation and wasting valuable resources.103 
Perez does not stand in isolation.  A district court also sent a strong 
warning to the parties that a continued abuse of Rule 36 would not be 
tolerated: “Surely, judicial and litigation economy and efficiency, the 
intended and vital purpose of Requests to Admit, were not promoted by 
 
99. Because the requests must be tied to the facts of the case, they also may not seek admissions 
to hypotheticals.  See, e.g., Buchanan v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 16-cv-4577, 2016 WL 7116591, slip op. 
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2016) (“Since requests to admit ‘must be connected to the facts of the case, 
courts do not permit “hypothetical” questions within requests for admission.’” (quoting Morley v. 
Square, Inc., No. 4:14cv172, 2016 WL 123118, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 1, 2016))). 
100. See Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 659 (“Unlike depositions, disclosure requests, 
interrogatories, and production requests, whose primary purpose is to discover facts or to obtain 
information and documents, requests for admission were not designed for these purposes.”). 
101. Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2002). 
102. Although still allowed in some jurisdictions—following the 1993 amendment to Rule 36—
requests for admission could no longer be served with the complaint in federal court.  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 36 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (requiring parties first to meet and confer 
regarding settlement of complaint and resolution prior to commencement of formal discovery 
procedures under Rule 26(f)); Fleet Credit Card Servs. v. Harden (In re Harden), 282 B.R. 543, 545–46 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002) (prohibiting the service of requests for admission before the Rule 26(d) 
conference (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 36 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; and then 
citing 10 WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 7036.02, 7036-3 (5th ed. rev. 
1997))). 
103. Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268; see also Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“The rule is not to be used in an effort to ‘harass the other side’ or in the hope that a party’s adversary 
will simply concede essential elements.” (quoting Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268)). 
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these parties.  A word to the wise to the parties: if this type of conduct 
persists, sanctions will assuredly be pursued sua sponte.”104 
Texas courts have gone a step further.  The Texas Supreme Court, 
in Wheeler v. Green105, “first held that when deemed admissions are not used 
as intended and ‘preclude presentation of the merits of a case, . . . due-
process concerns arise.’”106  Accordingly, in Texas, when requests are used 
for improper purposes and become merits-preclusive, a presumption in 
favor of withdrawal attaches.107 
Ill intent is frequently found in two circumstances.  The first is when the 
requests ask the party to admit what it has already denied in a responsive 
pleading or has asserted in its complaint.  The second is when the requests 
are sent alongside the complaint and summons.  Perez addressed each. 
As to the first, the court advised, 
Once a defendant has answered . . . it continues to be inappropriate for a 
plaintiff to re-serve the complaint in the form of a request for admissions in 
order to “require the defendant to admit or deny nearly every paragraph [of a 
complaint it has already answered].”  This is especially true here, where the 
defendants had denied [Plaintiff]’s core allegations . . . in the answers and 
again at the scheduling conference.  [Plaintiff]’s continued service of the same 
request for admissions in the face of these denials was an abuse of Rule 36.108 
 
104. Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 73, 81 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Thalheim 
v. Eberheim, 124 F.R.D. 34, 35–36 (D. Conn. 1988)); see also Roca Labs, Inc. v. Consumer Op. Corp., 
140 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1317 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (“The parties were twice placed on notice that 
advocacy does not include game playing.”). 
105. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). 
106. Time Warner, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 441 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. 
denied) (quoting Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443). 
107. Id. at 665–66 (citing Marino v. King, 355 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam)).  The 
presumption can be overcome by a showing of “flagrant bad faith or callous disregard of the rules” by 
the party who failed to answer.  Id. at 666 (quoting Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443). 
108. Perez, 297 F.3d at 1269 (citations omitted).  The reference to “continued service” is that 
the Plaintiff re-served the same requests along with nearly three dozen more later in the case.  
Id. at 1259. 
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Numerous courts have followed suit.109  Of course, Perez does not set forth 
a purely defendant-slanted standard.  It applies with equal force to 
counterclaims,110 and the logic extends to all pleadings.111 
The second circumstance is when the requests are served with the 
complaint and summons.  Although no longer permitted under Rule 36,112 
“[i]n many state courts, requests may be served at any time, including with 
pleadings.”113  Professor Kinsler has cautioned that “[o]ne tactic a lawyer 
should carefully watch out for, no matter which side of the case he or she is 
on, is the filing of requests for admissions with the initial pleadings.  It is 
 
109. Harmon v. Elkins Wrecker Serv., Inc., No. 1:12–cv–758–JEC, 2013 WL 2457957, at *3 
(N.D. Ga. June 6, 2013) (quoting Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268); Gaines-Hanna v. Farmington Pub. Sch. 
Dist., No. 04-CV-74910-DT, 2006 WL 891434, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2006) (quoting Perez, 
297 F.3d at 1269); HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[B], 30-6 (citing Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268); 
Wilken & Bloom, supra note 62, at § 36.10[7], 36-24–36-25 (quoting Perez, 297 F.3d at 1269).  But see 
United States v. Persaud, 229 F.R.D. 686, 694 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (concluding the “case present[ed] 
unusual circumstances warranting departure from the general rule proscribing ‘re-serving’ the 
complaint in the form of a request for admissions”); cf. Jackson v. Geometrica, Inc., 
No. 3:04CV640J20HTS, 2006 WL 213860, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2006) (“A review of the requests 
alongside the Complaint reveals they are not identical.  In any event, the Court is not of the view that 
three questions would rise to the level contemplated by the court in Perez.”). 
110. Bruggemann v. Amacore Grp., Inc., No. 8:09–cv–2562–T–30MAP, 2011 WL 1899251, 
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2011). 
111. See, e.g., Hungerford v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 517 A.2d 498, 501 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (“In addition, through his letter of June 12th and paragraph 2 of his 
complaint plaintiff had already notified Greate Bay before the requests for admissions were made that 
in his opinion the $17 per share price was not fair and reasonable.”).  In explaining the rationale of 
Perez, Professor Haydock and Mr. Herr write, “A plaintiff cannot include as a request the statements 
made in the complaint and demand that the defendant respond, because the defendant has already 
done so.”  HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[B], 30-6 (citing Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268).  The 
same rationale applies to a defendant promulgating requests to admit that contradict allegations of the 
complaint because the allegations of a complaint, like answers, are already binding judicial admissions 
upon the authoring party.  Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citing Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
112. See HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[A], 30-5 (noting the inability of a party to 
“unilaterally serve requests for admissions with pleadings”); Wilken & Bloom, supra note 62, 
at § 36.10[2], 36-22 (“Service of requests for admission generally must await the parties’ Rule 26(f) 
discovery conference.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1)); WRIGHT, supra note 48, at § 2257, 340 
(explaining that requests may not be sent prior to the Rule 26(f) conference absent court permission 
or written stipulation). 
113. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[A], 30-5; see also ARTHUR, supra note 27, 
at § 26.3, 708 (“The plaintiff may serve a request for admission upon another party with or after the 
service of the summons and complaint upon that party.” (citing IND. R. TRIAL P. 36(A)); Kinsler, supra 
note 14, at 636 (“[I]f requests for admission are served with the summons and complaint, the defendant 
is given forty[-]five days to respond.” (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 804.11(1)(b) (West 2017))). 
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easy for the attorney to overlook these early requests, resulting in a late 
filing.”114 
The advantages of serving requests for admission before an opposing 
party becomes engaged in the case are clear: either the recipient fails to 
answer in time, in which case the requests are deemed admitted;115 or, even 
if answered, it “has the potential for securing damaging admissions from the 
answering party before he or she has had a chance to formulate a case 
strategy.”116 
Perez also addressed the problem of service with the complaint, stating, 
“[W]e believe that it is inappropriate . . . for a plaintiff to serve a request for 
admissions along with the complaint.  It is simply too early for the 
defendant, having not yet received the allegations, to perceive what facts 
should or should not be contested.”117  Perhaps more importantly—a point 
echoed in Perez’s rejection of requests that mirror the pleadings—the 
complaint already obligates the defendant to admit or deny the allegations 
therein.118  Whatever justifiable purpose a request for admission could 
serve at such an early stage, the same purpose would appear served by an 
allegation incorporated into the complaint.119 
 
114. Kinsler, supra note 14, at 637 n.91 (citing MARK A. DOMBROFF, DISCOVERY § 6.14, 275 
(1986)). 
115. See, e.g., Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Goodwin, 422 S.E.2d 76, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (“If a party 
served with a request for admission does not serve an answer or objection and does not move for an 
extension of time or to withdraw the admissions resulting from a failure to answer, the matter stands 
admitted.” (quoting Albitus v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 283 S.E.2d 632, 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981))). 
116. Kinsler, supra note 14, at 637 n.88 (citing Mark A. Dombroff, Requests for Admissions: 
Weighing the Pros and Cons, TRIAL, June 1983, at 82, 85). 
117. Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2002); accord HAYDOCK & 
HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[A], 30-5 (reiterating a defendant is likely unable to determine which facts 
to contest at the time of service of the complaint (citing Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268–69)). 
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B). 
119. Of course, complaints are required to be short and plain.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).  But, as 
universally recognized, parties routinely add more to complaints than required.  See, e.g., Bartholet v. 
Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging parties’ tendency to over plea 
although the rules clearly discourage such a practice).  So long as the allegation is not “redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous,” which would merit striking under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12, inclusion in the complaint should provide a much more suitable forum.  FED. R. CIV. 
P. 12(f).  Of course, plaintiffs must be mindful not to get carried away.  See United States v. Lockheed-
Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Length may make a complaint unintelligible, by 
scattering and concealing in a morass of irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.  Three other 
circuits have held that length and complexity may doom a complaint by obfuscating the claim’s 
essence.” (citing In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702–03 (3d Cir. 1996))). 
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A third circumstance in which ill intent is more readily found is when 
requests for admission are used against unrepresented parties; this is 
because—failing to grasp the gravity of the requests—many frequently fail 
to timely respond.120  One court sternly concluded, “Requests for 
admissions should not be used as a tactical device to trap unwary pro se 
litigants.”121  In another case, the Court of Appeals of Indiana was quick to 
overturn a summary judgment obtained by use of baseless requests to a pro 
se party.122  However, not all courts are as quick to protect pro se litigants 
from the harsh and rigid application of deemed admissions.  In one instance, 
the Court of Appeals of Georgia awarded summary judgment against a pro 
se defendant who answered the complaint but failed to answer the 
accompanying requests for admission.123 
B. Oppressive Volume of Requests 
Another far too common tactic is to propound a wholly unreasonable 
number of requests for admission—often hundreds and even thousands.124  
 
120. Helbig v. Comm’r, No. 8011-06, 2008 WL 4735396, at *2 n.3 (T.C. Oct. 29, 2008); see also 
Costello v. Zavodnik, 55 N.E.3d 348, 350–51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (illustrating an example of a deemed 
admission where a pro se defendant failed to respond to discovery requests). 
121. Hungerford v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 517 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1986); see also Diggs v. Keller, 181 F.R.D. 468, 469 (D. Nev. 1998) (“[T]his Court holds that pro se 
prisoners are entitled to notice that matters found in requests for admission will be deemed admitted 
unless responded to within 30 days after such requests have been served.  Without such notice, pro se 
prisoners will most likely not be aware that failure to respond to a request for admission would result 
in the admission of the matters contained in the request.” (citing Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 
411–12 (9th Cir. 1988))); Mucek v. Nationwide Commc’ns, Inc., 2002 WI App 60, ¶ 84, 643 N.W.2d 
98, 122 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (Dykman, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is likely that pro se or inexperienced litigants 
will be the ones who are most often injured by the majority’s judicial policy against withdrawing 
admissions.”). 
122. Costello, 55 N.E.3d at 354.  Notably, both parties were without counsel at the time of trial.  
Id. at 349.  In Castello, the court reasoned that the deemed admissions, if allowed to stand, would 
completely dispose of the case.  Id. at 352.  Furthermore, the court found particularly significant the 
fact that the defendant here had already lost in the small-claim’s court proceedings.  Id.  And the court 
suggested that since the requests sought nothing to justify an award of damages, there is a “strong[] 
indicati[on] that [the] requests . . . had no basis in reality.”  Id. 
123. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Goodwin, 422 S.E.2d 76, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); cf. HAYDOCK & 
HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.07[E], 30-18 (stating courts enforce default admissions against pro se parties 
(citing Moses v. U.S. Steel Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841 (N.D. Ind. 2013))). 
124. See Misco, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 205 (6th Cir. 1986) (recalling plaintiff 
served 2,028 requests for admission across 343 pages, though many were later found to be 
interrogatories in disguise); Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 73, 81 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(presenting an instance where 148 requests were served); Schoenholtz v. Doniger, No. 83 Civ. 2740 
(IBC), 1984 WL 374, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1984) (serving 252 requests for admission under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)). 
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Although Rule 36—and those rules patterned upon it—do not include a 
limitation on the number of requests, there is an implicit limitation of 
reasonableness,125 and local rules may otherwise set a limit.126  Unless 
otherwise governed by local rule, the reasonable number of requests will 
depend upon the facts of a case.127  “Some cases will justify the use of a lot 
of requests; others a lot less.”128 
One court held that 177 requests in a discrimination case were not 
excessive.129  On the other hand, 182 requests—where “[t]here [we]re only 
two named Defendants . . . and one Plaintiff and the issues, while notably 
important, [we]re fairly succinct”—was held to be excessive.130 
 
125. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[D], 30-9; Wilken & Bloom, supra note 62, 
at § 36.10[5], 36-22.1 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)).  The Advisory Committee on the federal 
rules recently proposed instituting a presumptive limit of twenty-five requests.  Tidmarsh, supra note 1, 
at 856 n.2 (citing COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY 
AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 291, 310–11 (2013), https://www.ediscoverylaw.com/files/2013/11/ 
Published-Rules-Package-Civil-Rules-Only.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN8L-BWK3]).  The proposal did 
not advance out of committee.  Id. (citing Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Advisory 
Comm. on Civil Rules, on Report of Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules, to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair 
Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc. (May 2, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/fr_import/CV05-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4JB-TFGZ]). 
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A); GRIMM, supra note 1, at 165; STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE ET 
AL., FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK 915 (2014 ed.); Wilken & Bloom, supra note 62, at § 36.10[5], 
36-22.1 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A)). 
127. GRIMM, supra note 1, at 165; Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 672 (citing BP Amoco Chem. 
Co. v. Flint Hills Res., LLC, No. 05 C 5661, 2008 WL 4542738, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2008)). 
128. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[D], 30-9.  “One method of preempting a claim 
that the requests are so numerous as to be burdensome is to divide the requests into smaller sets and 
serve these sets in reasonably timed waves.”  Kinsler, supra note 14, at 636 (citing ROBERT B. CORRIS 
& MARK M. LEITNER, WISCONSIN DISCOVERY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.15 (1994)). 
129. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[D], 30-9 (citing Sommerfield v. City of 
Chicago, 251 F.R.D. 353, 354 (N.D. Ill. 2008)); see also Kinsler, supra note 14, at 636 (“[C]ourts have . . . 
[recently] approved requests containing 704 admissions, 244 admissions, and 106 admissions . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted) (first citing Photon, Inc. v. Harris Intertype, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 327, 328 (D. Mass. 
1961); then citing Berry v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 110 F.R.D. 441, 442–43 (N.D. Ind. 1986); and then 
citing Shawmut, Inc. v. Am. Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488, 489 (D. Mass. 1952))). 
130. Murray v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 08–cv–15147, 2010 WL 3464914, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 
Sep. 1, 2010); see also Stokes v. Interline Brands Inc., No. C-12-05527 JSW (DMR), 2013 WL 6056886, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (“In the interest of judicial economy, this court declines to determine 
the propriety of each of Defendant’s 1059 requests for admission in the 162-page submission.  Rather, 
the court finds that the sheer volume of the requests for admission is unduly burdensome and 
oppressive.  This case is straightforward; Plaintiff asserts only three state law causes of action based on 
Defendant’s reimbursement, wage deduction, and wage statement practices.  This is not the type of 
complex lawsuit that warrants voluminous discovery of the type propounded by Defendant.”). 
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In 2010, a district court, in ordering the number of request be capped at 
twenty-five, stated, “[M]any courts have limited by local rule the number of 
[r]equests for [a]dmission to [twenty-five].”131  My review of current132 
local rules for each federal district revealed an average cap of 18.3 for 
expedited track, 26.6 for standard track, and fifty for complex track, with 
twenty-five as the most frequently occurring of the standard track at ten of 
twenty-five rules and thirty as the second most frequent at nine.133  The 
majority of federal districts, however, do not have rules setting limitations.  
 
131. Murray, 2010 WL 3464914, at *1 (citing Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, 
Inc., No. 05-CV-329-TCK-SAJ, 2007 WL 54831, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 5, 2007); Estate of Manship v. 
United States, 232 F.R.D. 552, 558 (M.D. La. 2005)). 
132. “Local rules change frequently; the practitioner is advised to consult the most recent local 
rules of the particular district.”  Wilken & Bloom, supra note 62, at § 36.10[5], 36-22.1 n.6. 
133. See LOCAL RULES, CIVIL RULE 36.1 (S.D. CAL. 2017) (limiting requests for admission to 
twenty-five requests without leave of court); LOCAL RULES 36 (M.D. GA. 2017) (limiting requests for 
admission to fifteen); LOCAL RULES FOR CIVIL ACTIONS 36 (S.D. GA.) (limiting requests for 
admission to twenty-five); BANKRUPTCY LOCAL RULES 7005.1 (D. IDAHO BANKR. 2015) (limiting 
requests for admission to twenty-five); LOCAL RULES 26-1 (N.D. IND. 2016) (limiting requests for 
admission to thirty); LOCAL RULES B-7026-1 (N.D. IND. BANKR. 2016) (limiting requests for 
admission to thirty); LOCAL RULES 36-1 (S.D. IND. 2017) (limiting requests for admission to twenty-
five); LOCAL RULES B-7036-1 (S.D. IND. BANKR. 2010) (limiting requests for admission to twenty-
five); LOCAL RULES, LOCAL CIVIL RULES 36 (M.D. LA. 2015) (limiting requests for admission to 
twenty-five); LOCAL RULES, CIVIL RULES 26 (D. ME. 2016) (limiting requests for admission to thirty 
for standard track); LOCAL RULES, CIVIL 104(1) (D. MD. 2016) (limiting requests for admission to 
thirty); LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULES 7026-1 (D. MD. BANKR. 2013) (limiting requests for admission 
to thirty); LOCAL RULES 26.1(c) (D. MASS. 2008) (limiting requests for admission to twenty-five); 
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE 26.1(a)(1) (M.D.N.C. 
2017) (limiting requests for admission to fifteen); CIVIL LOCAL RULES 16.2CJ (D.N. MAR. I. 2010) 
(limiting requests for admission to thirty for standard and fifty for complex track); LOCAL CIVIL 
RULES 36.1 (S.D. OHIO 2016) (limiting requests for admission to forty); LOCAL CIVIL RULES 36.1 
(E.D. OKLA. 2016) (limiting requests for admission to twenty-five); LOCAL CIVIL RULES 36.1 
(N.D. OKLA. 2016) (limiting requests for admission to twenty-five); LOCAL COURT RULES, CIVIL 
RULES 36.1 (W.D. OKLA. 2014) (limiting requests for admission to twenty-five); RULES OF 
COURT 36.1 (M.D. PA. 2014) (limiting requests for admission to twenty-five); LOCAL RULES, 
CIVIL 16.2 (W.D. TENN. 2016) (limiting requests for admission to twenty for expedited track); LOCAL 
COURT RULES, CIVIL RULES 36 (W.D. TEX. 2012) (limiting requests for admission to thirty); LOCAL 
RULES 36.1 (E.D. WASH. 2015) (limiting requests for admission to fifteen); CIVIL RULES 39.2 (W.D. 
WASH.) (limiting requests for admission to ten); LOCAL RULES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 26.01 (N.D.W. VA. 
2010) (limiting requests for admission to forty); LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULES AND FORMS 7026-1 
(D. WY. BANKR. 2012) (limiting requests for admission to twenty). 
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Some states have built caps into their procedure rules,134 and others have 
left it for local rules.135 
This form of abuse by numbers is particularly apt to draw judicial ire 
because it can pose hefty burdens on courts as well as parties.  One case 
provides insight into the laborious process: 
The Plaintiffs have identified a number of the responses as being inadequate, 
approximately a third of the 148 Requests to Admit.  This Court took the time 
to read the entire 97[-]page Supplemental and Amended Responses to the 
Requests for Admissions.  This Court spent countless hours, too many hours 
in fact, trying to discern the content of these responses, and would not want 
this burden visited upon the trial court, no matter how complicated the 
litigation may be.  Even though the requests were more intelligible, the Court 
senses a trap is laid for the unwary in many of them.136 
  
 
134. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3) (limiting requests for admission to twenty-five); IOWA R. CIV. 
P. 1.510(1) (limiting requests for admission to thirty); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1281(2)(c)(3) (capping requests 
at ten for expedited actions); NEV. R. CIV. P. 36(c) (limiting “requests for admissions that do not relate 
to the genuineness of documents” to forty); OR. R. CIV. P. 45(F) (limiting requests for admission to 
thirty); OR. TAX CT. R. 45(F) (limiting requests for admission to thirty); S.C. R. CIV. P. 36(c) (limiting 
requests for admission to twenty); VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:11(e)(1) (limiting requests for admission to thirty). 
135. See LOCAL CIVIL RULES 26(F) (SUPER. & CIR. CTS., ALLEN COUNTY, IND. 2015) (limiting 
requests for admission to thirty); LOCAL COURT RULES 8(B) (CTY. CT., LAKE COUNTY, IND. 2015) 
(limiting requests for admission to thirty); MASS. UNIF. SUMMARY PROCESS R. 7(a) (limiting requests 
for admission to thirty); JUV. CT. LOCAL RULES OF PROCEDURE 46 (BUTLER COUNTY, OHIO 2007) 
(limiting requests for admission to twenty); LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2.11 
(C.P. GEN. DIV., GREENE COUNTY, OHIO 2013) (limiting requests for admission to forty); RULES OF 
COURT 4014 (CTY. CT., CARBON COUNTY, PA. 2016) (limiting requests for admission to forty); RULES 
OF COURT 4005-1 (DIST. CT., 9TH DIST. CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PA. 2017) (limiting requests for 
admission to forty); LOCAL RULES OF COURT, CIVIL RULES 4014 (CTY. CT., DAUPHIN COUNTY, 
PA. 2012) (limiting requests for admission to forty); LOCAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 39-4005 
(CTY. CT., FRANKLIN & FULTON COUNTY, PA. 2015) (limiting requests for admission to forty); 
LOCAL RULES, CIVIL LOCAL RULES 4014 (CTY. CT., MONTOUR COUNTY, PA. 2015) (limiting requests 
for admission to forty); LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE 8 (CH. CT., KNOX COUNTY, TENN. 2000) 
(limiting requests for admission to forty); LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE 14(b) (DIST. CT., 26TH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, TENN. 2000) (limiting requests for admission to thirty); LOCAL RULES, CIVIL 
RULES 26 (SUPER. CT., KING COUNTY, WASH. 2016) (limiting requests for admission to twenty); WY. 
R. CIV. P. CIR. CT. 8 (limiting requests for admission to twenty). 
136. Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 73, 81 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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C. Requesting Party Could Not Reasonably Have Believed the Request Would  
Be Admitted 
Consistent with the overarching obligation of good faith in discovery,137 
“[c]ontentions not subject to good faith dispute should be resolved through 
concession rather than by submission to a judge or jury.”138  Indeed, 
Federal Rule 37(c)(2) permits a party to recover costs and fees after 
establishing an important point was denied in response to requests for 
admission; however, only if there was no reasonable ground to deny the 
point.139  Consequently, it is not improper to tender a request for admission 
expecting it to be denied, so long as there would be no reasonable ground 
for the denial. 
But the converse is also true.  When the matter is clearly subject to a good 
faith dispute—such that no reasonable party would admit—the good-faith 
obligation dictates that requests not be sought.140  The New York rule may 
 
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B); Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
138. Kinsler, supra note 14, at 633 (quoting Ted Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 71 YALE L.J. 371, 376 (1962)). 
139. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2) (allowing the recovery of reasonable expenses unless the 
request was objectionable under Rule 36(a), the admission was not substantially important, the 
admitting party had a reasonable belief it would ultimately prevail, or there was some other good cause). 
140. See McNeese v. Access Midstream, L.P., No. CIV-14-503-D, 2017 WL 972156, slip op. 
at *1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 10, 2017) (“[T]he purpose of Rule 36 is to expedite trial by eliminating the 
necessity of proving undisputed and peripheral issues, and courts should not employ the rule ‘to 
establish facts which are obviously in dispute or to answer questions of law.’” (first citing Keen v. 
Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 554 (10th Cir. 1978); and then quoting Lakehead Pipe Line Co. 
v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997))); Asarco LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co., No. 2:12-cv-00283-EJL-REB, 2016 WL 1755241, at *12 (D. Idaho May 2, 2016) (“[R]equests for 
admission should not be used to establish facts which are obviously in dispute . . . .” (quoting Tuvalu 
v. Woodford, No. CIV S-04-1724 DFL KJM P, 2006 WL 3201096, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006))); 
Ross v. Shah, No. 1:12–CV–1006 (GTS/CFG), 2015 WL 4648002, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2015) 
(finding requests unenforceable because they “improperly sought the admission of the case’s 
fundamental legal issues” (citing Lakehead, 177 F.R.D. at 458)); United States ex rel. Dyer v. Raytheon 
Co., No. 08–10341–DPW, 2013 WL 5348571, at *6 (D. Mass. Sep. 23, 2013) (declaring requests to be 
improper because they sought admissions of intensely disputed issues (citing Lakehead, 177 F.R.D. 
at 458)); Hill v. Lappin, No. 3:10–CV–1743, 2012 WL 2049570, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 2012) 
(“Where . . . issues in dispute are requested to be admitted, a denial is a perfectly reasonable response.”); 
Estate of Bruess v. Blount Int’l, Inc., No. C09–2055, 2011 WL 2133626, at *5 (N.D. Iowa May 26, 
2011) (disallowing the amendment to an answer to request because the request involved a contested 
issue to which the respondent was not required to admit); Keaton v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
No. 4:07-CV-634-BSM, 2008 WL 2519790, at *3 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2008) (“Requests for admissions 
are not to be employed as a means [‘]to establish facts which are obviously in dispute or to answer 
questions of law.[’]” (quoting Lakehead, 177 F.R.D. at 458)); Tuvalu, 2006 WL 3201096, at *7 
(reiterating that requests for admission are not intended to establish disputed facts (quoting Lakehead, 
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have articulated the clearest standard: “[A] party may serve upon any other 
party a written request for admission . . . as to which the party requesting 
the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the 
trial . . . .”141 
Although not stated in the opinion, it is clear from Perez that the Eleventh 
Circuit holds a similar view: the content must be based upon some 
reasonable expectation that the requests will serve the purpose of 
Rule 36.142  The premise of Perez’s conclusion that it is impermissible to 
serve requests that mirror the complaint, is in line with the view that requests 
for admission are improper when they challenge facts that are obviously in 
dispute.  Indeed, many other courts have been leery toward requests that are 
“best paraphrased as ‘admit that we win the case.’”143  Perez and the courts 
that follow it are clearly of the same mold.144 
 
177 F.R.D. at 458)); Lakehead, 177 F.R.D. at 458 (establishing that requests for admission are not to be 
used to admit “facts which are obviously in dispute” (quoting Kosta v. Connolly, 709 F. Supp. 592, 
594 (E.D. Pa. 1989))).  But see Carney v. IRS (In re Carney), 258 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 
authority that 1970 amendment to Rule 36 allowed for requests as to ultimate facts, which would 
inevitably be disputed facts); Kinsler, supra note 14, at 628 (“The 1970 amendment made clear that 
FRCP 36 encompassed both opinions and disputable matters.”); Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 666 
(noting that although a party is free to request an admission to ultimate factual issues, it may be 
superfluous because they will inevitably be denied (first citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.1, 198.2(b); and then 
citing Hodge v. Parsons (In re Hodge), No. 12-02000314-CV, 2002 WL 31769635, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Tyler Dec. 11, 2002, orig. proceeding))). 
141. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3123(a) (McKinney 2009). 
142. Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2002). 
143. Williams v. Marshall, No. CV 106-037, 2010 WL 3291635, at *6 n.4 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 
2010) (quoting In re Carney, 258 F.3d at 422 (Duplantier, J., dissenting)), rejected in part by Williams v. 
Durden, No. CV 106–037, 2010 WL 3291803 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2010); see also McConnell v. Canadian 
Pac. Hills Plaza, No. 4:11–CV–0972, 2014 WL 201102, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014) (“As written, the 
questions would be impossible for defendant to respond to without conceding liability as to the entire 
case.”); Lakehead, 177 F.R.D. at 458 (“[B]y several of their Requests, the Defendants seek to have the 
Plaintiffs ratify what are, in essence, the legal conclusions that the Defendants have attached to the 
operative facts of the case.”); Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) 
(reiterating the primary purpose of requests for admission is not to “demand upon a plaintiff or 
defendant to admit that he had no cause of action or ground of defense” (quoting Sanders v. Harder, 
227 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex. 1950))); Time Warner, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 441 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (“[R]equests for admission are improper and ineffective when used to 
establish controverted issues that constitute the fundamental legal issues in a case.” (citing Cedyco 
Corp. v. Whitehead, 253 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied))); Wise & Fayne, 
supra note 11, at 660 n.9 (asking the respondent to admit matters that are obviously in dispute is 
contrary to the purposes for requests for admission (citing Marino v. King, 355 S.W.3d 629, 630 
(Tex. 2011))). 
144. See Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268 (“Rule 36 is a time-saver, designed ‘to expedite the trial and to 
relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts that will not be disputed at trial.’” (quoting WRIGHT, supra 
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A dissenting opinion from Wisconsin may have best explained the 
problem with such requests: 
Here, Mucek’s attorneys could not have seriously expected an affirmative 
answer to a request to admit that NCI intentionally files frivolous lawsuits 
against its customers to maliciously harass and intimidate them into 
continuing to use NCI’s services, and similar requests.  The attorneys could 
have had but one rational expectation: that NCI might not respond to the 
requests within thirty days, and since the time for trial was at hand, they could 
assert prejudice and perhaps prevail.  This expectation was enhanced by their 
knowledge that NCI’s attorney had withdrawn, and that NCI was, they 
believed, unrepresented.  They expected, if they were lucky, a Turkey shoot, 
and they got one.  This was not a lawsuit, the purpose of which is to find the 
truth.  This was a game, and its name was “Gotcha.”  NCI was certainly had.  
Although the trapped party in this case may have been a large corporation 
with a history of discovery abuse, it is likely that pro se or inexperienced 
litigants will be the ones who are most often injured by the majority’s judicial 
policy against withdrawing admissions.145 
Or, as another court colorfully noted, “Seeking an admission which assumes 
a contested fact is like asking a man to admit that he has stopped beating his 
wife.”146 
Sending requests that the author does not reasonably expect will be 
admitted does nothing more than set a trap and increase costs—neither of 
which is a permissible use of admissions.  “There is generally little to be 
gained from asking such requests because they invariably will be denied.”147 
IV.    ETHICAL LIMITATIONS ON REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Although a party upon whom requests for admission were improperly 
used may be able to withdraw the admission,148 withdrawal is never a 
 
note 48, at § 2252, 322)); see also Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2007) (following 
Perez’s approach for the proposition that requests for admission are not intended to force the party to 
admit to contested issues or “essential elements” (quoting Perez, 297 F.3d at 1268)). 
145. Mucek v. Nationwide Commc’ns, Inc., 2002 WI App 60, ¶ 84, 643 N.W.2d 98, 121–22 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (Dykman, J., dissenting). 
146. Estate of Bruess v. Blount Int’l, Inc., No. C09–2055, 2011 WL 2133626, at *5 n.11 
(N.D. Iowa May 26, 2011). 
147. Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 666 (citing Hodge v. Parsons (In re Hodge), No. 12-
02000314-CV, 2002 WL 31769635, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 11, 2002, orig. proceeding)). 
148. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a procedure for withdrawing or amending 
an admission obtained under Rule 36: 
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certainty.149  Alternatively, the party who identifies the impropriety, prior 
to the trap springing, could seek a protective order.150  Even if 
accomplished, the costs for doing so—both in time and money—are 
inescapable.151  Those problems, however, can be avoided by simply not 
abusing requests for admission in the first place. 
 
A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits 
the admission to be withdrawn or amended.  Subject to Rule 16(e), the court may permit 
withdrawal or amendment if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the action and if 
the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending 
the action on the merits.  An admission under this rule is not an admission for any other purpose 
and cannot be used against the party in any other proceeding. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b).  Rule 16(e), however, provides some limitation on the courts discretion: “The 
court may modify the order issued after a final pretrial conference only to prevent manifest injustice.”  
Id. at R. 16(e). 
149. See Conlon, 474 F.3d at 621 (“Rule 36(b) is permissive, not mandatory, with respect to the 
withdrawal of admissions.” (citing Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 
1981))); DeLong v. Merrill, 310 P.3d 39, 43–44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (agreeing “that the court may 
allow withdrawal or amendment of an admission, but is not required to do so” (citing Conlon, 474 F.3d 
at 621, 624–25)); GRIMM, supra note 1, at 167 (“There is no absolute right to withdraw admissions once 
made, however, to warrant amendment, the moving party must show that the facts previously admitted 
were not true.” (citing Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Dentz-Allis Corp., 120 F.R.D. 655, 660 
(E.D.N.C. 1998))). 
150. See, e.g., Stokes v. Interline Brands Inc., No. C-12-05527 JSW (DMR), 2013 WL 6056886, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (moving for a protective order based on “1059 requests for admissions 
served by Defendant”).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides: 
A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the 
court where the action is pending . . . .  The motion must include a certification that the movant 
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to 
resolve the dispute without court action.  The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect 
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, 
including . . . forbidding the disclosure or discovery . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A).  Therefore, a party may move for a protective order if (1) the party has 
attempted to confer to resolve the issue; and (2) the party will face undue burden or expense if the 
protective order does not issue.  Id. 
151. Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).  The court not only 
spends time in deciding the withdrawal request, but the losing parties may cost the court additional 
time in malpractice suits against abusive counsel.  See Mucek v. Nationwide Commn’cs, Inc., 2992 WI 
App 60, ¶ 83 n.13, 643 N.W.2d 98, 121 n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (Dykman, J., dissenting) (“As one 
commentator has pointed out, a refusal to permit withdrawal of inadvertent admissions of central 
issues will often ultimately lead to the expenditure of more rather than less court time as the losing 
party is likely to file a malpractice action against his or her attorney.” (citing Engel, supra note 14, at 75)). 
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Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it is the duty of all 
lawyers to refrain from improper use of legal procedures.152  Of course, as 
in all aspects of litigation, the rules of professional conduct apply to 
discovery.  “As one commentator noted, ‘[D]iscovery abuse is a function of 
professional ethics.’”153  Indeed, merely because a procedural rule does not 
specifically prohibit certain conduct, does not mean that it is not otherwise 
prohibited as unethical by rules of professional conduct.154 
In rare instances, some courts have adjudicated or commented on ethical 
violations stemming from the use of requests for admission.  Courts have 
disciplined lawyers for failing to timely respond to requests,155 and for 
submitting false responses.156  At least one court has also signaled that the 
use of boilerplate objections constitutes a violation of Model Rule 3.4(d).157  
 
152. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 5 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2017). 
153. Dickerson, supra note 10, at 297 (quoting Robert E. Sarazen, Note, An Ethical Approach to 
Discovery Abuse, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 470 (1990)). 
154. See Korte v. Hunter’s Mfg. Co., No. 3:12-cv-791-MJR-DGW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
62058, at *2–4 (S.D. Ill. May 1, 2013) (finding counsel’s conduct to “border on unprofessionalism” for 
generating an unnecessary amount of discovery); Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments 
and the Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 776–77 (2000) (“Courts . . . have read a requirement 
of professional courtesy into Rule 8.4(d), however, finding that failing to act with professional courtesy 
is ‘prejudicial to the administration of justice.’” (quoting Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1264 n.7 
(Ind. 1999))).  But see Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645–46 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating ethics 
rules cannot be used to undermine federal procedure rules, requiring a court to balance the federal 
interests at stake); Howard M. Erichson, Foreword, Civil Procedure and the Legal Profession, 79 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1827, 1828–29 (2011) (discussing the danger of treating rules of professional conduct as 
governing civil litigation in addition to rules of civil procedure (citing Andrew Perlman, The Parallel Law 
of Lawyering in Civil Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1965, 1973 (2011))). 
155. See In re Riddle, 857 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Ariz. 1993) (finding violations of the state equivalents 
of Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4 (citing Disciplinary Comm’n Report, In re Riddle, 837 P.2d 1233 (Ariz. 1993) 
(Comm. No. 89–1589))); Colvin v. Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, 832 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Ark. 1992) 
(refusing to disturb the committees finding that Rule 1.3 had been violated); Attorney Discipline, UTAH 
B.J., May/June 2012, at 57, 57 (showing violations of Rules 1.3 and 8.4); Disciplinary Report, ALA. LAW., 
Sept. 1994, at 311, 312 (providing an example of a violation of Rule 1.1); Kinsler, supra note 14, at 671 
(noting that “an attorney was suspended from practice for two years for, inter alia, failing to respond to 
a series of requests for admission” (citing Porter v. State Bar, 801 P.2d 1135, 1136 (Cal. 1990) (in banc) 
(per curiam))). 
156. See In re Usher, 987 N.E.2d 1080, 1088 (Ind. 2013) (per curiam) (concluding the respondent 
violated “Rule 3.3(a)(1) by knowingly submitting false responses” to requests for admission); Feld’s 
Case, 815 A.2d 383, 388 (N.H. 2002) (“[Lawyer]’s assistance with [client]’s responses constituted a 
violation of Rules 3.4(b), 3.4(c) and 3.4(d).”); In re Estrada, 143 P.3d 731, 740–43 (N.M. 2006) (per 
curiam) (implicating state equivalents of Model Rules 1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 & 8.4). 
157. Matthew L. Jarvey, Note, Boilerplate Discovery Objections: How They Are Used, Why They Are 
Wrong, and What We Can Do About Them, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 924–25 (2013) (citing Mancia v. 
Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 362 (D. Md. 2008)); see also Lynn v. Monarch Recovery 
Mgmt., 285 F.R.D. 350, 364 (D. Md. 2012) (finding boilerplate objections improper in responding to 
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There appears to be one court, however, that has directly examined whether 
the content of a request was unethical.  In State Bar v. Rossabi,158 the court 
reversed a determination of the North Carolina Disciplinary Hearing 
Commission, which found a request for admission that the opposing party 
had engaged in sexual conduct with her attorney, constituted a violation of 
Rules 3.4(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).159  The reversal does not shed much light 
into analyzing the content of requests, however, because the determination 
was simply that the requests were neither frivolous nor oppressive.160 
Due to the dearth of authority, the discussion must turn to 
prognostication.  Although certainly not an exhaustive list, the improper 
uses of requests for admission discussed above appear to implicate 
numerous provisions of the Model Rules.161  The only rule that specifically 
applies to discovery is Rule 3.4(d),162 which prohibits frivolous discovery 
requests.  Similarly, and often associated with misdeeds in discovery, is 
Model Rule 3.2.163  Rule 3.2 more broadly prohibits conduct that inhibits 
expedient resolution of discovery.164  In the same vein is Model Rule 4.4(a), 
which prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct that has “no substantial 
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.”165 
 
requests for admission, because such objections fail to provide any description of why the respondent 
should not have to admit the requested information (citing Hall v. Sullivan, 231 F.R.D. 468, 470 
(D. Md. 2005); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 173 (D. Md. 2001); 
Marens v. Carrabba’s Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35, 38–39 (D. Md. 2000))). 
158. N.C. State Bar v. Rossabi, 645 S.E.2d 387 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
159. Id. at 393–94. 
160. Id. 
         161.   See, e.g., id. at 390 (“[D]efendants had violated Rules 3.4(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.”).  
162. Dickerson, supra note 10, at 300.  “Model Rule 3.4(d) provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall not . . . 
in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to 
comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.’”  Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
163. See GRIMM, supra note 1, at 331, 406 (“Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2 . . . may be 
violated by abuse of the discovery process, causing the court to refer the offending lawyer to the 
appropriate disciplinary authorities.”); HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 8.09, 8-21 (emphasizing 
the effect of Model Rule 3.2, which “attempts to reduce the urge that lawyers have to engage in lengthy 
and time-consuming discovery”). 
164. AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 303–04 
(6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES]. 
165. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
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Less traditionally associated with discovery is Model Rule 3.1.166  As one 
court wrote, “[t]he prohibition by Rule 3.4(d) against frivolous discovery 
requests is ‘akin to the lawyer’s duty under Rule 3.1 regarding meritorious 
claims and contentions.’”167  Due to the potential for requests to be used 
to obtain a verdict as the result of gamesmanship, Model Rule 3.1 is also 
implicated. 
Model Rules 3.1 through 3.9 fall under the heading “Advocate” because 
they govern an attorney’s duties to others, including the court, in the 
adversarial process.  But abuse of requests for admission may also implicate 
an attorney’s duties to her client.  When her conduct is a clear violation of 
the law of the jurisdiction, Model Rule 1.1—which dictates that a lawyer 
must provide competent representation—would be violated.168  Further, 
use that serves no justifiable purpose and increases the client’s bill runs afoul 
of Model Rule 1.5.169 
Finally, the rules themselves are not the totality of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  The preamble to the rules provide courts with a 
source to control iniquitous behavior when the actions of counsel run 
contrary to the underlying spirit of ethical dictates,170 even if the conduct is 
not directly in violation of the specific rules.171 
A. Model Rule 3.4(d): Frivolous Discovery Requests 
Model Rule 3.4(d) states, “A lawyer shall not . . . make a frivolous 
discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a 
 
166. Model Rule 3.1 provides “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there 
is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”  Id. at r. 3.1. 
167. Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoffman (In re Application for Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman), 
2003 ND 161, ¶ 28, 670 N.W.2d 500, 506 (N.D. 2003) (per curiam) (citing ABA/BNA LAWYER’S 
MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 61:721 (1997)). 
168. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 164, at 21–22 (noting many courts require the 
attorney to have knowledge of requisite procedures and substantive law, and if not, they require the 
attorney to conduct adequate research to become familiar). 
169. Model Rule 1.5(a) provides: “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect 
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  “Paragraph (a) [to Model Rule 1.5] requires that lawyers charge fees that 
are reasonable under the circumstances.”  Id. at r. 1.5 cmt. 1.  This also includes a requirement that the 
expenses a client incurs as a result of the attorney’s conduct be reasonable.  Id. 
 170. See id. at preamble ¶ 10 (“[The] ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely 
in the courts.”). 
171. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1264 (Ind. 1999) (demonstrating that the 
spirit of the rules, as indicated by the preamble, requires a lawyer to notify opposing counsel of an 
impending motion for default even if the opposing counsel has not filed an appearance, so long as the 
attorney seeking default knows the defendant to be represented). 
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legally proper discovery request by an opposing party . . . .”172  “This rule 
is a more specific amplification of the general duties to advance only 
meritorious claims and to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation 
recognized by the Model Rules.”173  It acts to constrain a lawyer’s duty of 
zealous advocacy on behalf of the client and to avoid impermissibly 
burdening the court and others.174 
The limitations of Rule 3.4(d) were well summarized by Professor 
Beckerman: 
In pretrial procedure, Rule 3.4 forbids propounding a frivolous discovery 
request or failing to try to comply with a discovery request by an opposing 
party.  It notably does not prohibit all obstruction, alteration, destruction and 
concealment (only that which is unlawful), or limit discovery (except as to that 
which is “frivolous”), or require prompt compliance with discovery requests 
(requiring instead, only “reasonably diligent effort[s] to comply with . . . legally 
proper discovery request[s]”).175 
Neither Rule 3.4 nor Rule 1.0 defines “frivolous.”176  It is, however, 
defined in the Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers: “A 
frivolous position is one that a lawyer of ordinary competence would 
recognize as so lacking in merit that there is no substantial possibility that 
 
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  Some states have 
varied slightly in some circumstances from the dictates of Model Rule 3.4.  See Am. Bar Ass’n  
CPR Policy Implementation Comm., Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional  
Conduct, AMERICANBAR.ORG (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_3_4.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VGG-
YXCS] (comparing state alternatives to Model Rule 3.4). 
173. Wendel, supra note 8, at 918–19 (footnotes omitted) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.1, 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
174. See Jarvey, supra note 157, at 924–25 (reiterating the notion that “attorneys do not have 
unfettered licenses to engage in frivolous discovery tactics, even if such tactics arise out of attorneys’ 
desire to zealously advocate for their clients” as noted in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2000))). 
175. Beckerman, supra note 49, at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
176. Model Rule 1.0 defines the terminology of the Model Rules.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.0 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (failing to define “frivolous”); see also id. at r. 3.4 (rejecting the 
lawyer’s ability to “make frivolous discovery requests” but failing to explain what would constitute a 
frivolous request under this standard). 
 
40 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 8:2 
the tribunal would accept it.”177  As Judge Paul Grimm, a frequent author 
on issues pertaining to discovery,178 wrote: 
A lawyer who seeks excessive discovery given what is at stake in the litigation, 
or who makes boilerplate objections to discovery requests without 
particularizing their basis, or who is evasive or incomplete in responding to 
discovery, or pursues discovery in order to make the cost for his or her 
adversary so great that the case settles to avoid the transaction costs, or who 
delays the completion of discovery to prolong the litigation in order to achieve 
a tactical advantage, or who engages in any of the myriad forms of discovery 
abuse that are so commonplace is, as Professor Fuller observes, hindering the 
adjudication process, and making the task of the “deciding tribunal not easier, 
but more difficult,” and violating his or her duty of loyalty to the “procedures 
and institutions” the adversary system is intended to serve.  Thus, rules of 
procedure, ethics and even statutes make clear that there are limits to how the 
adversary system may operate during discovery.179 
The North Dakota Supreme Court, through In re Hoffman,180 has 
provided some insight into the application of Rule 3.4(d) to requests for 
 
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000); see also Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoffman (In re Application for Disciplinary Action Against 
Hoffman), 2003 ND 161, ¶ 28, 670 N.W.2d 500, 506 (N.D. 2003) (per curiam) (“A claim is frivolous 
when there is [‘]such a complete absence of actual facts or law that a reasonable person could not 
have[’] expected the court to rule in his favor.” (quoting Lawrence v. Delkamp, 2003 ND 53, ¶ 13, 
658 N.W.2d 758, 766 (N.D. 2003))).  In regard to discovery, the Restatement states: “[T]he Section 
permits a lawyer to assert on behalf of the client any nonfrivolous basis for noncompliance.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
Section 110(3) corresponds to Model Rule 3.4(d).  Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 
354, 362 n.6 (D. Md. 2008). 
178. See generally GRIMM, supra note 1 (providing a comprehensive guide to issues in discovery); 
Paul W. Grimm, The State of Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and 
Burden, or Can Significant Improvements Be Achieved Within the Existing Rules?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 47 
(2011) (“[T]he tools already exist to ensure that the civil litigation process is cost-effective, is 
proportional to what is at issue in the litigation, and affords both sides fair discovery to ensure that 
essential facts needed to adjudicate or resolve the case are discovered.”); Grimm & Yellin, supra note 1 
(“By shedding light on why civil discovery has become so problematic, this Article will attempt to 
explore how the causes of discovery problems can be addressed.”). 
179. Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 362–63 (footnotes omitted) (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); then 
citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); and then citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927 (2008)). 
180. Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoffman (In re Application for Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman), 
2003 ND 161, 670 N.W.2d 500 (N.D. 2003) (per curiam). 
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admission.181  The court held that an attorney violated the rule by serving 
“112 requests for admissions and 58 interrogatories, each with many sub-
parts.”182  Of those, “[t]he district court sustained objections . . . to all but 
23 of the requests for admissions and all but eight of the interrogatories.”183  
The court also found the content of the requests and interrogatories, which 
probed the sexual history of the opposing party, “did [not] serve any 
substantial purpose other than to burden or harass.”184 
Although In re Hoffman does not expound upon the full scope of abusive 
requests for admission, it provides a clear example of Rule 3.4(d)’s 
application.  It is impossible to say from the text of the opinion whether, 
standing alone, either the volume or content would have supported a finding 
of a Rule 3.4(d) violation.  But given that the court signaled both aspects to 
be beyond the scope of acceptable conduct,185 it seems likely that each 
would have been found frivolous on their own. 
Generally, Rule 3.4(d) will not be violated where counsel acts in good 
faith.186  Of the three circumstances which signal an improper request for 
admission discussed above, only the second—the volume of requests—
seems likely to find salvation in the good faith defense; this is because 
“reasonable volume” can be fact specific and subject to debate, provided 
that there is no rule already in place to limit the number of requests.187  The 
other two circumstances—bad faith use and where the requesting party 
lacks a reasonable belief that the responding party will admit—squarely fit 
Rule 3.4(d) without sanctuary in good faith. 
 
181. See id. at 506 (“The use of discovery to intimidate, harass, or burden another is prohibited 
under [Rule] 3.4(d).” (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 668 (Md. 1989))). 
182. Id. at 506–07. 
183. Id. at 506. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. (signaling discovery requests can violate Rule 3.4(d) for both content and volume). 
186. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 3.4-4, 834 (2013–2014 ed.) (“The mere fact that a 
legal position is ‘creative’ or contrary to existing law does not make that position frivolous.”).  Rotunda 
and Dzienkowski described an example of this: “The existing law often has ambiguities and always has 
potential for change.  Therefore[,] a lawyer, in seeking to subpoena a document that appears to be 
protected as privileged, may still make a ‘good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal 
of existing law.’”  Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 & cmt. 1 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)).  Therefore, so long as the attorney can show that the discovery request was 
made in good faith there may be a safe harbor from the harsh penalties described above. 
187. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Minge v. TECT Aerospace, Inc., No. 07–1212–MLB, 2012 WL 
1631678, at *5 (D. Kan. May 8, 2012) (“Defendants have failed to establish that the number of requests 
for admissions submitted is, on its face, substantively objectionable given the complexity of the case.”). 
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B. Model Rule 3.2: Requests That Delay & Burden 
Although the text of Model Rule 3.2 does not mention discovery, it is 
frequently addressed in the context of discovery tactics used to cause 
delay.188  The rule states, “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to 
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”189  “Dilatory 
discovery tactics violate Rule 3.2.”190  But Rule 3.2 is not limited to 
temporal delay, it also “prohibits . . . making of litigation unreasonably 
expensive.”191  As applied to discovery, one source finds that the rule 
“places current practice in perspective and attempts to reduce the urge that 
lawyers have to engage in lengthy and time-consuming discovery just 
because all the top-floor law firms do it.”192 
One commentator provides: 
The official comment explains that the test is “whether a competent lawyer 
acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some 
substantial purpose other than delay[,]” and notes further that “[r]ealizing 
financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a 
legitimate interest of the client.”193 
Nevertheless, like Model Rule 3.4, Model Rule 3.2 is not an omnibus 
mandate to engage speedily through discovery.  It “does not require 
unlimited efforts, but only ‘reasonable’ ones consistent with client 
interests.”194 
Reminiscent of the reasonableness limitation on volume, one court has 
signaled that a violation of Model Rule 3.2 occurs where the volume of 
briefing far exceeded the subject matter at hand: 
[I]t is professional misconduct for an attorney to “engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  Such acts can include obstructing 
 
188. See, e.g., In re PRB File No. 2007–003, 2009 VT 82A, ¶ 8, 987 A.2d 273, 275 (Vt. 2009) (per 
curiam) (finding an attorney who delayed litigation by failing to timely respond to discovery requests 
had violated Rule 3.2). 
189. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  States have varied 
slightly in their use of Model Rule 3.2.  See Am. Bar Ass’n CPR Policy Implementation Comm., supra 
note 172 (comparing applicable state rules to Model Rule 3.2). 
190. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 164, at 303. 
191. GRIMM, supra note 1, at 331. 
192. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 8.09, 8-21. 
193. Beckerman, supra note 49, at 529 n.103 (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
194. Id. at 529 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
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access to evidence, failing to reasonably respond to discovery requests, or 
other dilatory acts that run counter to “reasonable efforts to expedite 
litigation.”  In this particular case, this Court finds counsel’s conduct to border 
on unprofessionalism in the length, tenor, and indignation that was displayed 
in the filings in this Court.  Relatively minor discovery disputes should not 
generate numerous pages of briefs, especially when this Court has a readily 
available mechanism to expeditiously resolve discovery disputes.195 
Building on that decision, it appears Model Rule 3.2 is violated, not only by 
conduct that has a clear intent to inflate costs or extend litigation, but also 
is disproportionate to the magnitude of the case. 
Specific guidance in the context of requests for admission is wanting.196  
A decision from Colorado found an attorney violated Rule 3.2 by, among 
other things, failing to respond to requests, resulting in deemed 
admissions.197  But the court did not explain what facts applied to the 
Model Rule 3.2 determination, which suggests that the court may have 
viewed the failure as part of the Model Rule 1.3 violation.198 
Even in the absence of substantial authority, it is fairly clear that abuses 
in requests for admission will often violate Model Rule 3.2.  As explained in 
Perez, when requests are abused, “the rule’s time-saving function ceases; the 
rule instead becomes a weapon, dragging out the litigation and wasting 
valuable resources.”199  Preventing both delay and unnecessary exhaustion 
of resources is the purpose of Rule 3.2. 
C. Model Rule 4.4(a): Requests That Harass & Burden 
Similar to both Rules 3.2 and 3.4(d), Model Rule 4.4(a) states, “In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial 
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use 
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a 
 
195. Korte v. Hunter’s Mfg. Co., No. 3:12-cv-791-MJR-DGW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62058, 
at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. May 1, 2013) (citations omitted) (first quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); and then quoting id. at r. 3.2, 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
196. One source appears to discuss Rule 3.2 in requests for admission, but appears to have 
meant Rule 3.3.  Wendel, supra note 8, at 914 n.91. 
197. People v. Holmes, 921 P.2d 44, 46–47 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (per curiam). 
198. See id. (failing to distinguish which factors applied to which rule violation). 
199. Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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person.”200  Perhaps due to its reference to “third persons,” which may be 
mistaken as persons from outside the litigation, Rule 4.4 is very rarely 
invoked in the context of discovery.201 
Model Rule 4.4, however, applies to protect parties to the litigation as well 
as non-parties.202  Outside the discovery context, “[s]everal courts have 
applied Model Rule 4.4 to conduct directed at opposing counsel” and “to 
lawyers’ conduct toward opposing parties.”203  Almost universally, Model 
Rule 4.4 has been reserved for particularly egregious behavior, such as 
physical threats of harm.204  Nevertheless, there are at least two examples 
where Model Rule 4.4, although not mentioned, could have easily been 
applied to abusive requests for admission. 
As discussed above, in Rossabi, the North Carolina Disciplinary Hearing 
Commission ruled that an attorney had violated Model Rules 3.4(d), 8.4(c), 
and 8.4(d) for submitting requests that probed the sexual relationship 
between the opposing party and her counsel.205  Although the court 
reversed, finding the requests to be meritorious,206 the finding of the 
commission could certainly have satisfied Model Rule 4.4, though it too 
would have been reversed.  The commission found: “Request number 5 . . . 
was not relevant to the issues in the Avery County lawsuit, and was asked 
with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass not only Dr. Lackey, but also 
Cheuvront.”207 
 
200. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  States have also 
deviated from Rule 4.4.  See Am. Bar Ass’n CPR Policy Implemtation Comm., supra note 172 
(comparing state equivalents of Model Rule 4.4). 
201. See Lath v. Oak Brook Condo. Owners’ Ass’n, No. 16–cv–463–LM, 2017 WL 401198, 
slip op. at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 2017) (refusing to extend the authority of Rule 4.4 to protect a party 
within the litigation at hand when violations may have occurred in a separate action); Dickerson, supra 
note 10, at 297 (“Even though the Model Code does not expressly mention discovery or depositions, 
its Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules apply . . . .”). 
202. In re Oladiran, No. MC–10–0025–PHX–DGC, 2010 WL 3775074, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sep. 21, 
2010) (“The comment to Rule 4.4(a) explains that the rule seeks to protect litigants and third-parties 
from unnecessary embarrassment and undue delays and burdens.” (citing ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4.4(a) cmt. 1 (STATE BAR OF ARIZ. 2003))). 
203. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 164, at 415. 
204. See id. at 414–16 (noting a case in which a lawyer was disciplined for threatening to hit an 
opponent “in the head with a baseball bat” (quoting In re Burns, 657 N.E.2d 738, 739 (Ind. 1995) (per 
curiam))). 
205. N.C. State Bar v. Rossabi, 645 S.E.2d 387, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
206. Id. at 393–94. 
207. Id. at 393 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, In re Hoffman found requests regarding the party’s sexual history 
“served no other purpose than to burden or harass.”208  The court held that 
the requests violated Model Rule 3.4(d), but the finding specifically mimics 
the language of Model Rule 4.4.209  Ironically, the court also found a 
Model Rule 4.4 violation, but for different conduct.210 
Of course, Model Rule 4.4 is not confined merely to requests that are 
designed simply to embarrass.  It also applies to requests that serve no 
substantial purpose other than to burden the opposing party.211  Just like 
Model Rules 3.4(d) and 3.2, when the requests accomplish nothing more 
than burden the answering party, Model Rule 4.4 is violated. 
D. Model Rule 3.1: Frivolous Discovery & Litigation Generally 
In many ways Model Rule 3.4(d) “is a more specific amplification of the 
general duties to advance only meritorious claims” set forth in Model 
Rule 3.1.212  Model Rule 3.1 broadly states, “A lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is 
a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a 
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law.”213  It “allows the assertion of issues in a proceeding when there is a 
basis for doing so that is ‘not frivolous.’”214 
Typically, Model Rule 3.1 is viewed in the context of the litigation as a 
whole, but it may also apply specifically to discovery.215  One instance 
 
208. Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoffman (In re Application for Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman), 
2003 ND 161, ¶ 30, 670 N.W.2d 500, 506–07 (N.D. 2003) (per curiam). 
209. Compare id. at 505–06 (holding the purpose of the request was to burden or harass), with 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (prohibiting lawyers from taking 
actions that have no other purpose other than to burden, harass, or delay litigation). 
210. See In re Hoffman, 670 N.W.2d at 505–06 (holding that a threat made by a mother’s attorney 
to the father in a custody dispute that the father would not have visitation rights if he did not discuss 
such rights with the attorney first violated Rule 4.4). 
211. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
212. Wendel, supra note 8, at 918–19 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
213. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  States have differed 
in their adoption and application of Model Rule 3.1.  See Am. Bar Ass’n CPR Policy Implementation 
Comm., supra note 172 (comparing state modifications to Model Rule 3.1). 
214. Vt. Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02, at 3 (2004), available at 
https://www.vtbar.org/UserFiles/files/Webpages/Attorney%20Resources/aeopinions/Advisory%2
0Ethics%20Opinions/Deceit%20Fraud/04-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8KA-6AWC]. 
215. Maura I. Strassberg, Privilege Can Be Abused: Exploring the Ethical Obligation to Avoid Frivolous 
Claims of Attorney-Client Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 413, 428 (2007) (“What is of concern in this 
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where Model Rule 3.1, although not used as the basis for discipline, likely 
could have applied was In re Hoffman.216  Although, as already discussed, it 
was decided on Model Rule 3.4(d) grounds, the court noted, “The 
prohibition by Rule 3.4(d) against frivolous discovery requests is ‘akin to the 
lawyer’s duty under Rule 3.1 regarding meritorious claims and 
contentions.’”217  Consequently, it would appear that most, if not all, 
discovery-based violations of Model Rule 3.4(d) also constitute violations of 
Model Rule 3.1. 
More concerning, however, is the use of requests for admission to render 
a frivolous claim or defense a winner.  With the power of deemed 
admissions, the real facts can be supplanted by facts that do not faithfully 
reflect reality.  In so doing, it is entirely possible to use requests for 
admission to succeed on a meritless claim or defense by virtue of procedural 
gamesmanship.218  Doing so is in direct conflict with the goal of Model 
Rule 3.1, which imparts on attorneys “a duty not to abuse legal 
procedure.”219 
E. Model Rule 1.5: Goldbricking 
Although the focus up to this point has been on the use of requests for 
admission as an underhanded tactic against opponents, misuse can also 
violate an attorney’s ethical duties to her client.  Model Rule 1.5 governs 
collection of fees from a client.220  In relevant part, it states, “A lawyer shall 
not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an 
unreasonable amount for expenses.”221  Application of Model Rule 1.5 is 
not merely confined to whether the total amount charged to a client is within 
the realm of reasonableness; it prohibits charging for services that are 
 
Article, however, is not frivolous claims and defenses, but rather frivolous objections to, or resistances 
to, compulsory evidentiary processes such as civil or criminal discovery . . . .  These are covered both 
by Model Rule 3.1 . . . and Model Rule 3.4 . . . .”). 
216. Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoffman (In re Application for Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman), 
2003 ND 161, ¶ 27, 670 N.W.2d 500, 506 (N.D. 2003) (per curiam). 
217. Id. (quoting ABA/BNA LAWYER’S MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT 61:721 (1997)). 
218. See, e.g., Mucek v. Nationwide Commn’cs, Inc., 2002 WI App 60, ¶ 36, 643 N.W.2d 98, 
107–09 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding deemed admissions that the admitting party would never have 
admitted but were outcome determinative). 
219. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
220. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Under Shelter of Confidentiality, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 8 (1999). 
221. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); cf. Am. Bar Ass’n 
CPR Policy Implementation Comm., supra note 172 (describing relevant deviations from Model 
Rule 1.5). 
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unreasonable.222  “A lawyer basing the fee on the hours expended obviously 
may not engage in goldbricking, that is, employing wasteful procedures in 
an effort to multiply the number of billable hours.”223 
Except where invocation of Federal Rule 37(c)(2) may reasonably be 
expected, there is no merit to serving requests for admission that the 
proponent does not reasonably believe will be admitted.224  Even if the 
request is used to set a trap, springing the trap may do little more than 
increase the cost of litigation if the trapped party is able to obtain relief from 
the admissions.225  If the admissions are timely and properly denied, then 
there has been no benefit to the client, only costs.226 
Professor Kerper and Mr. Stuart have aptly recognized the incentive for 
lawyers to engage in even meritless discovery against their clients’ interests: 
“In a market-based system of legal representation, it is convenient for 
lawyers to leave no stone unturned for clients who pay by the stone.”227  As 
another commentator said, “Discovery is particularly ripe territory for 
billing fuzziness, especially when the client can’t see how his or her money 
 
222. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
223. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 186, at § 1.5-1(b), 161 (citing MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
224. See supra Part III(C) (discussing requests that no reasonable party would admit); see also 
Wise & Fayne, supra note 11, at 666 (“There is generally little to be gained from asking such requests 
because they invariably will be denied.” (citing Hodge v. Parsons (In re Hodge), No. 12-02000314-CV, 
2002 WL 31769635, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 11, 2002, orig. proceeding))). 
225. See HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.02, 30-4 (noting a party’s ability to withdraw 
admissions with permission from the court); see also United States ex rel. Thomas v. Black & Veatch 
Special Projects Corp., No. 11–2475–DDC, 2014 WL 2095168, at *7–8 (D. Kan. May 20, 2014) 
(allowing withdrawal of the admission but criticizing the defendants approach and imposing additional 
discovery time and costs upon the party). 
226. The Model Rules deem “[r]ealizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper 
delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 
cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
227. Janeen Kerper & Gary L. Stuart, Rambo Bites the Dust: Current Trends in Deposition Ethics, 22 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 103, 111 (1998) (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: 
Text, Subtext, and Context, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 29, 38 (1991)); see also Wigler v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 
108 F.R.D. 204, 205 (D. Md. 1985) (“A closer look reveals that the defendant’s requests represent an 
attempt not just to nail down the core facts of the case, but also to pick every nit that a squad of lawyers 
could possibly see in it.”); Beckerman, supra note 49, at 578 n.302 (acknowledging even the simplest 
case can be made to run into infinity, all the while charging the client); Grimm & Yellin, supra note 1, 
at 525–26 (recognizing that misguided discovery tactics often result in a burden on the client). 
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is actually being spent.”228  Consequently, requests that do nothing more 
than increase the costs a client must pay for her counsel to litigate the case, 
violate Model Rule 1.5.229 
F. Model Rule 1.1: Competency 
Where a request for admission is used in a manner contrary to well-settled 
law of a jurisdiction, Model Rule 1.1 comes into play.230  Included among 
the obligations of a lawyer to provide competent representation is a 
“requisite familiarity with well-settled legal” procedures.231  Violations of 
procedural rules may also form a basis for discipline under Model 
Rule 1.1.232 
A perfect example of an abuse of requests that may violate Model 
Rule 1.1 is Perez.233  Despite the clear prohibition in Federal Rule  36(a),234 
 
228. Robert Hilson, Five Ways to Avoid Getting Sued for Discovery Malpractice, FLA. B.J., Jan. 2016, 
at 40, 40; see also Harris, supra note 52, at 575 (noting frivolous lawsuits are an unprofessional abuse 
which may have an adverse impact on clients, adversaries, and the public). 
229. Although a clear violation of Rule 1.5, discipline for charging a client to serve unnecessary 
requests for admission is unlikely.  See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 164, at 68 (finding only 
two cases in which attorneys were disciplined for the size of the fee absent an additional finding of 
dishonesty or misconduct (citing Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an 
Unreasonable Price? Limitations on Attorneys’ Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990))); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“In 
many jurisdictions, authorities have been reluctant to discipline lawyers on such grounds.  For a variety 
of reasons, discipline might be withheld for charging a fee that would nevertheless be set aside as 
unreasonable in a fee-dispute proceeding.”). 
230. Model Rule 1.1 provides: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  
States have varied in their adoption of Rule 1.1 standards.  See Am. Bar Ass’n CPR Policy 
Implementation Comm., supra note 172 (comparing states’ modifications of Model Rule 1.1). 
231. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 164, at 22.  Presumably, “well-settled” generally 
necessitates the existence of procedural rules or caselaw.  Cf. Wendel, supra note 8, at 914 (“[T]he Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct circumscribe a lawyer’s advocacy only by legal norms, which presumably 
include applicable case law and procedural rules . . . .” (footnote omitted) (citing MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017))). 
232. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 164, at 23–24. 
233. See generally Perez v. Miami-Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
defendant’s motion to withdraw should have been allowed under the proper test of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 36(b)). 
234. At the time of Perez, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) specifically stated that requests 
could not be sent prior to the Rule 26(f) conference.  That language was added as part of the 1993 
amendments.  FED. R. CIV. P. 36 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.  The 2007 
amendments removed the language as a redundancy, now unnecessary due to general familiarity with 
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plaintiff’s counsel served requests for admission alongside the complaint.235  
Similarly, in jurisdictions that cap the number of requests,236 sending 
requests beyond the express limitation of the rule may also violate Model 
Rule 1.1. 
Model Rule 1.1 has been applied at least twice in disciplinary proceedings 
arising out of responses to requests for admission.237  An attorney in 
Alabama was found to have violated the applicable version of Model 
Rule 1.1 for, among many other things, failing to respond to requests for 
admission.238  Due to the full scope of egregious conduct, which led the 
“client to lose his home,”239 it is difficult to glean much in applying Model 
Rule 1.1 to the requesting party. 
More informative is In re Estrada.240  The New Mexico Supreme Court 
held that a baseless denial of requests for admission constituted incompetent 
representation in violation of New Mexico’s version of Model Rule 1.1.241  
The court wrote, “Generally, this rule addresses whether less experienced 
attorneys have sufficient knowledge and skill to handle their cases.  But 
failure to respond to discovery has been held to be a failure of competent 
representation.  And, in our view, failure to understand what is required by 
the discovery rules demonstrates incompetence.”242 
Extrapolating from the general principles of Model Rule 1.1 and Estrada, 
the promulgation of requests that are contrary to the obligations required 
by the discovery rules can violate the competency requirements of Model 
Rule 1.1.  Of course, whether Model Rule 1.1 has been violated is a fact 
sensitive inquiry to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.243 
 
the requirement.  FED. R. CIV. P. 36 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment.  The language 
now remains solely in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d).  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). 
235. Perez, 297 F.3d at 1258. 
236. See supra at nn.133–35 (providing limitations imposed by both local rules and state rules of 
procedure). 
 237. In re Estrada, 143 P.3d 731 (N.M. 2006) (per curiam); Disciplinary Report, supra note 155, 
at 311. 
238. Disciplinary Report, supra note 155, at 312. 
239. Id. 
240. In re Estrada, 143 P.3d 731 (N.M. 2006) (per curiam). 
241. Id. at 740. 
242. Id. (citing In re Moore, 494 S.E.2d 804, 807 (S.C. 1997) (per curiam)). 
243. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 186, at § 1.1-1, 90 (“Reasonable lawyers can 
make reasonable mistakes.  The lawyer is not competent when the mistake is not reasonable, and she 
is competent if the mistake is reasonable.”). 
 
50 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 8:2 
G. Preamble to the Model Rules 
Even if none of the enumerated Model Rules specifically apply, attorneys 
are still bound by the spirit of the Rules generally.244  The Indiana Supreme 
Court explained: 
The Rules are guidelines for lawyers and do not spell out every duty a 
lawyer owes to clients, the court, other members of the bar and the public.  
The preamble to the Rules is clear that “[t]he Rules, do not, however, exhaust 
the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no 
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules.”  Thus[,] 
lawyers’ duties are found not only in the specific rules of conduct and rules of 
procedure, but also in courtesy, common sense and the constraints of our 
judicial system.  As an officer of the Court, every lawyer must avoid 
compromising the integrity of his or her own reputation and that of the legal 
process itself.245 
By its nature, the preamble is a nebulous source for ethics guidelines and 
is without easily definable lines.246  Invocation is reminiscent of Justice 
Stewart’s famous approach to “define what may be indefinable[:] . . . . I 
know it when I see it.”247  But descriptors such as “nebulous” and “ill-
 
244. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  One 
commentator has gone as far to say,  
The professional [legal ethics] rules are merely the basement level, the lowest common 
denominator, of acceptable lawyer conduct.  Lawyers who consider compliance with them to be 
complete fulfillment of legal ethics are the equivalent of the cave dwellers in Plato’s The Republic 
who sincerely and contentedly believe that mere shadows are reality.  But believing it so does not 
make it so. 
Harris, supra note 52, at 550 (alteration in original) (quoting Barrie Althoff, Big Brother is Watching: 
Discipline for “Private” Conduct, in 2000 Symposium Issue of the Professional Lawyer 81, 87). 
245. Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1263–64 (Ind. 1999) (quoting MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)).  But cf. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Coyne, 
7 N.E.3d 300, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding rules of professional conduct do not create broad 
discovery obligations to disclose in the absence of corresponding discovery requests). 
246. See, e.g., Fink v. Neal, 945 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Ark. 1997) (“The Preamble to our Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct states that a ‘lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate 
purposes and not to harass and intimidate others.’  At some point, a series of errors . . . moves beyond 
mere negligence and enters the realm of harassment and intimidation, whether intentional or not.  We 
do not mean to suggest that every Rule 11 violation equates to a violation of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  And yet we have no doubt that James was harassed by counsel’s actions, and 
that this conduct qualifies as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” (quoting MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017))). 
247. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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defined” are common-place in discovery practice and do not prevent 
litigation sanctions.248 
Despite its failings, the broad dictates of the preamble may be precisely 
the answer for resolving the fundamental problem of using requests for 
admission as a trap or club with which to beat an opponent into submission 
or a client into paying a higher charge.  As already discussed, courts 
frequently find requests for admission tendered in bad faith to be 
improper.249  It is that spirit of ill will and bad faith that runs contrary to 
the goals and spirit of the Model Rules as a whole,250 which may make 
resort to the preamble appropriate. 
V.    DISCIPLINE & SANCTIONS: THE NEED FOR STRONG OVERSIGHT 
Even if litigation conduct constitutes a violation of ethics rules, it does 
not necessarily merit professional discipline.251  Comment 1 to Model 
Rule 8.4 indicates, “Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or 
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .”252  As one 
commentator observed, “[A]n attorney who violates any other ethics rule 
automatically violates Rule 8.4 . . . .”253  Courts, however, are loath to 
impose discipline for mere technical violations.254  Ultimately, whether 
 
248. See Jack T. Camp, Thoughts on Professionalism in the Twenty-First Century, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 
1389 (2007) (“A number of recent court decisions have recognized the obligation that attorneys have 
to comply with the spirit of the discovery process, even when the attorney has not violated a specific 
rule.  The courts often refer to the obligation as one of good faith or as an obligation to comply with 
the spirit as well as the letter of the rules.” (footnote omitted) (citing Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial 
Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1425, 1445 (2004))); Wendel, supra note 8, at 908–18 (discussing the amorphous landscape of judicial 
authority to sanction abusive discovery conduct). 
249. See supra Part III(A) (discussing bad faith in depth). 
250. Douglas R. Richmond, Class Actions and Ex Parte Communications: Can We Talk?, 68 MO. L. 
REV. 813, 816 n.17 (2003) (“Of course, ‘the abuse or misuse of any rule of civil procedure is a violation 
of the spirit of the rules of professional ethics on the most basic level.’” (quoting Blanchard v. 
EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293, 304 (N.D. Ill. 1997))). 
251. Barbara L. Margolis, Ten Things to Do If You Receive a Disciplinary Complaint, R.I. B.J., 
Jan./Feb. 2006, at 21, 21 (“Remember, not all violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct result 
in formal discipline.”). 
252. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
253. Dickerson, supra note 10, at 300 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2017)). 
254. See Freeman v. Mayer, 95 F.3d 569, 575 (7th Cir. 1996) (determining a technical violation 
of a rule does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action for breach of a legal duty (citing Schornick 
v. Butler, 185 N.E. 111, 112–13 (Ind. 1993))); see also In re Dean, 2003-2478 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So. 2d 
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discipline is appropriate will depend upon the surrounding facts and 
circumstances.255 
Doubtlessly viewed as fortunate by some and unfortunate by others, even 
conduct that would appear to merit formal discipline often goes overlooked 
by disciplinary bodies.  That is particularly true in the case of abusive 
discovery, because “disciplinary authorities often defer to the trial courts 
[for] policing.”256  To an extent, yielding control over litigation conduct 
may work, due to the overlap between courts’ powers to sanction and the 
prohibitions of the professional rules.257  However, “while there is 
substantial overlap with rules of procedure and evidence, the Model [Rules] 
stand . . . as ‘a separate source of applicable substantive law.’”258 
Perhaps the biggest problem with disciplinary authorities ceding 
responsibility for overseeing abusive litigation to courts is that litigation 
sanctions and professional discipline are intended to serve different 
purposes.   
When a lawyer is disciplined, the objective “is not to punish the lawyer 
but to deter similar conduct by other lawyers.  Other lawyers and the public 
need to know that failure to pursue a client’s case and failure to inform a 
client of the outcome of a case will not be tolerated.”259  Discovery 
sanctions, however, are broader, encompassing both a deterrence and 
punitive function, along with seeking to provide compensation to the court 
and parties for abusive conduct.260 
Viewed through the lens of protecting the public at large, disciplinary 
authorities may prove less reluctant to tolerate abusive behavior.  Trial 
courts, however, “are reluctant to impose sanctions that may adversely 
affect the professional reputations and livelihoods of lawyers who practice 
 
152, 156 n.4 (La. 2004) (per curiam) (“[W]e find a technical violation of Rule 8.4(c) based on 
respondent’s stipulation, but do not find this violation is egregious.”). 
255. ABA COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: RULES AND STANDARDS 443 
(2013–2014 ed.). 
256. Schneyer, supra note 6, at 42. 
257. Id. 
258. Glist, supra note 154, at 777 (quoting In re Porter, 890 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Or. 1995) (en banc) 
(per curiam)). 
259. In re Riddle, 857 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Ariz. 1993) (citation omitted); see also STANDARDS FOR 
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 1.1 (1986) (AM. BAR. ASS’N, amended 1992) (“The purpose of lawyer 
discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice . . . .”). 
260. Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1453 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Roadway 
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1980); Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 
427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam); Aztec Steel Co. v. Fla. Steel Corp., 691 F.2d 480, 482 (11th Cir. 
1982) (per curiam)). 
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before them.”261  Though a problem in civil litigation generally, it is 
exacerbated in the realm of discovery. 
Despite courts often decrying abusive discovery practices, the perception 
among litigants, merited or not, is that judges are extremely reluctant to 
engage in and police discovery disputes.262  Further resulting in reluctance 
to seek court intervention is the belief that courts tend to “split the baby” 
in resolving disputes.263  Because discovery is governed primarily by the 
litigants,264 perception is reality.  As Judge Easterbrook recognized, “Judges 
can do little about impositional discovery when parties control the legal 
claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves.”265 
In the realm of requests for admission, there is some dispute about what, 
if any, sanctions can be obtained for abusive conduct.  Federal Rules 36 
and 37 make clear that failure to respond and improper denials carry with 
them the sanctions of deemed admissions and awarded costs respectively 
for establishing the facts.266  One court, however, deeming that it would 
otherwise render Federal Rule 37(c) redundant and that requests for 
admission are not a discovery device, ruled that the broader power to 
sanction discovery abuses of Federal Rule 26 does not extend to requests 
 
261. Beckerman, supra note 49, at 511. 
262. Id. at 518; Ronit Dinovitzer & Jeffrey S. Leon, When Long Becomes Too Long: Legal Culture 
and Litigators’ Views on Long Civil Trials, 19 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 106, 121–22 (2001); David A. 
Green, The Fallacy of Liberal Discovery: Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases in the E-Discovery Age, 
44 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 719 (2016); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The 
Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform”, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 238–39 (2001). 
263. Adam Babich, The Wages of Sin: The Violator-Pays Rule for Environmental Citizen Suits, 
10 WIDENER L. REV. 219, 275–76 (2003) (citing Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of 
Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and 
Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 797–98 (1998)); Lindsey D. Blanchard, 
Rule 37(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”: More Bark Than Bite, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 125 (2011) (citing 
ROBERT E. KEETON, KEETON ON JUDGING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 167 (1999)).  “Of 
course, the wisdom of King Solomon’s decision was that it only threatened to divide the baby . . . .”  
Schaffer v. Comm’r, 779 F.2d 849, 852 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985).  “His wisdom would have been called into 
question, however, if he had gone through with the act.”  W. Va. Dep’t of Corr. v. Lemasters, 
313 S.E.2d 436, 440 (W. Va. 1984). 
264. Beckerman, supra note 49, at 515. 
265. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 638. 
266. See FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(3) (asserting a matter is deemed admitted unless the party who 
receives the request returns a written answer or objection to the requesting party); id. at R. 37(c)(2) 
(explaining failure to admit a properly requested document or information may result in penalty of 
payment for reasonable expenses upon whom the request was made). 
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for admission.267  On the contrary, in a non-precedential decision, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed an award of sanctions against a pro se litigant for 
propounding requests that had “no relevance to the underlying action and 
could only be intended to harass defendant.”268 
Assuming that litigation sanctions may be imposed for abusive conduct 
in using requests for admission, the benefit of seeking a protective order is 
often outweighed by the cost and uncertainty.  Undoubtedly, the cost-
benefit ratio is a factor in requests for admission being “less litigated” than 
other discovery disputes.269  Only on rare occasions may the sheer volume 
of requests or probing content merit seeking court involvement.270 
Because the opportunities are rare, courts must be diligent in acting firmly 
to curb abusive tactics.271  Courts have many options for addressing the 
problems with abusive conduct such as, “a warm friendly discussion on the 
record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, 
monetary sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the 
circumstances.”272  Additionally, because disciplinary authorities have 
largely ceded responsibility for governing litigation abuse to trial courts, 
when conduct runs afoul of both procedural and ethics rules, courts must 
be cognizant to recognize and address the ethical violation as well.273 
Of course, caselaw is an imperfect vehicle for educating the bar.274  
Nevertheless, through strict adherence to case law, some inroads can be 
 
267. Point Blank Sols., Inc. v. Toyobo Am., Inc., No. 09–61166–CIV, 2011 WL 742657, 
at *3 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2011). 
268. Wiideman v. Bayer, No. 93-15140, 996 F.2d 1230 (Table), 1993 WL 217065, at *1 (9th Cir. 
June 18, 1993).  It was far from the only time that particular litigant was sanctioned.  See, e.g., Wiideman 
v. Del Papa, 5 F. App’x 496, 496 n.1 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting history of reported cases for that litigant, 
many of which included sanctions). 
269. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 9, at § 30.03[B], 30-6. 
270. See, e.g., Stokes v. Interline Brands Inc., No. C–12–05527 JSW (DMR), 2013 WL 6056886, 
at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (“[T]he court finds that the sheer volume of the requests for 
admission is unduly burdensome and oppressive.”). 
271. See Beckerman, supra note 49, at 571–87 (arguing failure to deter discovery misbehavior 
through the effective use of sanctions may “fundamentally undermine our system’s policy of deciding 
controversies on their merits”); Camp, supra note 248, at 1388 (“If professionalism [amongst lawyers] 
is to be improved, sanctions for unprofessional conduct by the courts will be necessary.”); Moskowitz, 
supra note 23, at 645 (“In this climate, rules are not likely to be complied with unless they are vigorously 
enforced.”). 
272. Kerper & Stewart, supra note 227, at 117 (quoting Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Sav. 
Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 288 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (per curiam)). 
273. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 164, at 322 (recognizing that courts may look to 
ethics rules when imposing litigation sanctions). 
274. Mordesovitch v. Westfield Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (S.D.W. Va. 2002). 
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made.275  Ultimately, the end to discovery abuse must be found in a change 
of the legal culture, which must start somewhere.276 
Of course, even if this all-too-common conduct never leads to formal 
discipline or even sanction, it inevitably strikes against a lawyer’s esteem in 
the profession.277  As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes astutely 
remarked: 
The highest reward that can come to a lawyer is the esteem of his professional 
brethren.  That esteem is won in unique conditions and proceeds from an 
impartial judgment of professional rivals.  It cannot be purchased.  It cannot 
be artificially created.  It cannot be gained by artifice or contrivance to attract 
public attention.  It is not measured by pecuniary gains.  It is an esteem which 
is born in sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests.  It is an 
esteem commanded solely by integrity of character and by brains and skill in 
the honorable performance of professional duty. . . .  In a world of imperfect 
humans, the faults of human clay are always manifest.  The special temptations 
and tests of lawyers are obvious enough.  But, considering trial and error, 
success and defeat, the bar slowly makes its estimate and the memory of the 
careers which it approves are at once its most precious heritage and an 
important safeguard of the interests of society so largely in the keeping of the 
profession of the law in its manifold services.278 
It is left for speculation why so very many attorneys are willing to 
routinely place their reputations on the line for nothing more than bating a 
trap that will likely never spring, and even more likely will never yield 
positive results for the client.279  Were I to speculate, I would suggest that 
 
275. Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc. v. Elk Run Coal Co., 246 F.R.D. 522, 530 (S.D.W. Va. 
2007). 
276. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 647–48. 
277. UNITED STATES DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA, THIRD ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP (1997), republished in 73 N.D. L. REV. 805, 816 (1997) 
(“A lawyer who obstructs, who breaks or bends the rules, who treats his opponent uncivilly, is sending 
a message to the judge’s subconscious: ‘Rule against me when you can.’” (quoting Wendel, supra note 8, 
at 943)); see also Frontier-Kemper, 246 F.R.D. at 530 (“Because civil actions are more frequently settled as 
opposed to tried, a lawyer’s reputation is made in discovery and motion practice and it is in those areas 
that the court expects full compliance with the applicable rules and case law.”). 
278. RAGBAG OF LEGAL QUOTATIONS 236 (reprint 1992) (M.F. McNamara ed. 1960) (quoting 
Charles Evan Hughes, Remarks in Reference to the Late George Wickersham, 13 PROC. AM. L. INST. 61 
(1936)). 
279. One commentator has attributed the growth in the size of law firms and “the rarity in large 
cities of litigators encountering the same adversary repeatedly” as a reason for litigators’ willingness to 
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requests for admission that serve no defensible purpose are the product of 
a lack of understanding of the purpose and utility of requests for admission, 
conditioning,280 and simply never having thought of unfounded requests in 
ethical terms.281 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
Requests for admission can be one of the most effective and powerful 
tools in shaping a case ahead of trial.282  But when used as a shortcut to 
prevent a determination upon the actual merits of the case, they can prove 
to be a “double-edged sword[,]”283 inviting their users to engage in 
counterproductive, unethical behavior.  For, as Cicero instructed his son, 
“[I]t is only by moral character and righteousness, not by dishonesty and 
craftiness, that they may attain to the objects of their desires.”284  The truly 
 
risk reputation because “[o]ne-time encounters lessen the force of reputation as a restraining influence 
on adversarial behavior and do nothing to foster cooperation.”  Beckerman, supra note 49, at 520. 
280. As Magistrate Judge Peggy Leen has noted in the context of boilerplate objections to 
discovery, which courts have uniformly rejected as improper, lawyers do so merely because they have 
been “conditioned” to do so.  Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-0528-APG-PAL, 
2014 WL 6675748, at *4–5 (D. Nev. Nov. 24, 2014).  However, a compelling argument is made by 
Professor Beckerman that the legal system incentivizes abusive litigation tactics simply by allowing 
courts to reward the user.  See Beckerman, supra note 49, at 579–83 (providing a compelling example 
of a wealthy attorney who has found great success in uncivil tactics). 
281. Of course, failure to recognize ethical obligations is not a defense, and, indeed, is often a 
factor ruling against attorneys in discipline matters.  See Sorensen v. State Bar, 804 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1991) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (asserting a lack of insight with regard to ethical obligations is not a mitigating 
factor when determining sanctions for improper conduct); see also In re Gumaer, 867 P.2d 850, 852–53 
(Ariz. 1994) (explaining neither unfamiliarity “nor the exigencies of a busy court” excuse a failure to 
observe ethical obligations); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Teaching Ethics in Evidence, 
21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 961, 961 (2003) (“A significant source of unethical behavior by lawyers is a 
failure to recognize ethical issues.”); Howard T. Markey, A Need for Continuing Education in Judicial Ethics, 
28 VAL. U. L. REV. 647, 650 (1994) (“Obviously inadvertence or ignorance of the rules is not an 
excuse.” (citations omitted)); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 
45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1153–56 (2013) (discussing why lawyers fall into ethical traps). 
282. Kinsler, supra note 14, at 625. 
283. Id. at 625–26. 
284. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 179 (Walter Miller trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1913) (44 B.C.); see also id. at 303 (“Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form 
or other, we cannot help being influenced by it.  But if upon closer inspection one sees that there is 
immorality connected with what presents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to 
sacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency where there is immorality.”); 
Nelson P. Miller, The Nobility of the American Lawyer: The Ennobling History, Philosophy, and Morality of a 
Maligned Profession, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 209, 238–45 (2005) (analyzing Cicero’s impact on legal 
ethics). 
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expedient litigator will avoid the ethical pitfalls of using requests as a trap or 
a tool for inflating litigation costs. 
 
